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INTRODUCTION
Associate Professor Gordon J. Hawkins
Assisrant Director. lnstitute of Criminology.
Sydney University Law School.
Back in I939 when American criminologist Edwin Sutherland coined
the term “white-collar crime" to refer to commercial. or professional
criminality his ideas were regarded by many as unorthodox and radical.
Sutherland's analysis of violations ofthe law by the seventy largest indu5trial
and commercial corporations in the United States and his conclusion that
they behaved like professional thieves were seen as an attack on the capitalist
system.
Nowadays it is widely recognized that criminal activity ofa white-collar
nature (e.g. embezzlement, fraud. price-rigging, tax evasion, bribery, graft
and other forms of thievery from the public) causes far greater economic
losses to the community than those caused by the traditional crimes against
property such as burglary, robbery and larceny. And throughout the world
crime en col blanc, criminalita in collem' biarichi. Weisse- Kragen-
Krimi'na/itar. or el deliio de cue/lo blanco is receiving increasing attention
from criminologists and law enforcement agencies.
Many people now take the view that business and professional crime,
long ignored because it offers no immediate. recognizable threat to our
persons or our property, is in fact the most threatening and socially harmful
crime of all. In America the formidable Ralph Nader, claiming that the
most urgent crime problem consists. not of crime in the streets and such
offences as mugging but rather of “crime in the suites“ and environmental
crimes like “smogging”, has waged a highly successful campaign against
corporate crime of various kinds.
Ironically Sutherland is seen by today’s radicals as a somewhat
conservative ﬁgure who did not represent any kind of threat to the capitalist
system. He was against white-collar crimes and found business practices like
antitrust violations offensive. it is said, only because they undermined basic
American principles of economic competition and free trade.
Yet Sutherland’s pioneering role in this field is generally acknowledged
although not everyone would go as far as the noted British criminologist
Hermann Mannheim who suggested that if there had been a Nobel Prize for
criminology Sutherland would have deserved it for his work on white-collar
crime. There is no doubt however that he opened up a new and important
realm for research and investigation.
Until relatively recently white-collar crime received little attention in
Australia possibly because while there is a demand for stories about people
violently robbing businesses there is less of one for stories about businesses
peacefully robbing people. Latterly however the development of militant
consumer and environmental constituencies and some spectacular company
crashes costing investors millions of dollars have resulted in more news
coverage.
  
 Public awareness ofabuses and malpractices in the securities industry,
stock manipulations. company frauds. insider trading profits and the
diversion of unprotected investments into offshore havens, Swiss banks.
hidden trusts and obscure Hong Kong trading companies is limited. but it is
growing. It is true that the wealthy, guilty of blatant ﬁnancial chicanery. are
rarely imprisoned while the poor are frequently imprisoned merely for being
poor (i.e. for vagrancy), but the possibility that some kind of injustice, or at
least inconsistency, is involved in this sort of discrimination is gaining
recognition.
The Institute of Criminology can claim to have played some part in
increasing public awareness and recognition of the nature and extent of these
types of criminal activity. White collar crime and corporate criminality have
now been the subject of four ofour seminars. The relevant previous volumes
ofthe lnstitute's Proceedings are: No l9 Corporate Crime(l974); No 23 White
Collar Crime — Can the Courts Handle [1?(1975); and No 28 Corporate
Crime N0 2 (l976).
At the most recent seminar which is reported in this volume of
Proceedings the Institute was fortunate to secure the participation of three
distinguished speakers all of whom have made significant contributions in this
area. Attorney-General Frank Walker has. since he assumed office in 1976.
accorded a priority to white-collar crime and demonstrated a determination
to deal with it. unique in the annals of Australian politics and law
enforcement. Professor Gilbert Geis is one of the world‘s leading authorities
on white-collar crime and White Collar Crime: Offences in Business. Politics
and the Professions(rev.ed. 1977), which he co-edited with Robert F. Meier. is
recognized as one of the principal text books on the subject. Rodney Purvis
who is a member of the Institute‘s Advisory Committee has played a key role
both as an organizer of and participantin our previous seminars concerned
with this topic, and is also the author of a book entitled Corporate Crime.-
Crime. Corporations and Commercial Morality in Australia soon to be
published by Butterworths Pty Limited. It will be clear to readers of this
volume of the Proceedings that we were extremely fortunate in the quality of
the speakers and papers at what proved to be one of the most stimulating
seminars to have been held by the Institute.
 
 NEW PROPOSALS FOR DEALING WITH
“WHITE COLLAR" CRIME
The Honourable Frank Walker. LL.M.. M. P.
N.S.W. Attorney-General and Minister of Justice.
Background
Very soon after the present Government came into office in 1976. 1
established within my Ministerial ofﬁce a “Criminal Law Review Division“,
its function being continuously to review the Criminal Law ofthis State. Ithen
requested that the Director of the Division (Mr. Roger Court. QC.) give
priority to a review of the law in a number ofspeciﬁc areas. One such area was
corporate and “white collar" crime and in particular the problems being
experienced in the prosecution ofcorporate and/or “white collar" offences of
an economic nature.
In November 1977. Mr. B.R. Kinchington, a Crown Prosecutor with
particular experience in Companies prosecutions. was seconded to the
Division as a special consultant in relation to that general area.
In October 1978. Mr. Court and Mr. Kinchington presented to me a
joint Report entitled “Report of the Criminal Law Review Division on
Summary Prosecution in the Supreme Court of Corporate and/or ‘White-
Collar’ Offences of an Economic Nature.“
Summary of Proposals
The Report summarised its major recommendations as follows:
13.1 That trial byjury be no longer mandatory in relation to certain corporate
and/ or “white collar“ offences ofan economic nature (paragraph 4.2) and that
an alternative and concurrent summary jurisdiction be conferred upon the
Supreme Court (see paragraphs 5.5 and 9.1).
13.2 That the Attorney General, or some person(s) nominated by him, may
require the summary trial before a Supreme Court Judge without ajury of
persons charged with such offences (see paragraphs 9.1 and 9.2).
Preferably, such proceedings shall be instituted directly in the Supreme Court.
Additionally, however, proceedings may also be remitted from courts ofpetty
sessions to the Supreme Court.
13.3 That an accused person convicted summarily by a Supreme Court Judge
have a right of appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal. such appeal to be by
way of re-hearing (see paragraph 5.12).
' No. 13. 1978 (Second Session). Parliament of New South Wales. Government Printer
N.S.W. 1979.
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13.4 (Per Mr. Kinchington only —) That the Crown have a right ofappeal to
the Court of Criminal Appeal against the acquittal of an accused person
summarily by a Supreme Court Judge, such appeal to be by way of re-hearing.
(Note: Mr. Court is opposed to this proposal — paragraphs 5.14 and 5.15 —
but agrees that the Crown havea right ofappeal on(a) questions oflaw and (b)
sentence).
13.5 That the offences which may be so dealt with summarily be those
enumerated in paragraphs 7.4, 7.7. 7.8 and (on the condition referred to in
paragraph 7.10) 7.9.
(The offences enumerated in the paragraphs referred to were the following:
7.4 Crimes Act
i Secu’ons
j 165 Agent misappropriating money entrusted to him
j 166 Agent misappropriating goods entrusted to him
168 Fraudulent sale of property by agent
169 Fraudulent sale of property under power of attorney
170 Agent wrongfully obtaining advance on property of his
principal
172 Trustee fraudulently disposing of property ‘
173 Director, etc., fraudulently applying property -
174 Director, etc., omitting to make entries in books of
account
1,75 Director, etc., wilfully destroying books. etc. _ " - ' .
176 Director, etc., publishing fraudulent statements
178A Fraudulent misappropriation of money received
179 False pretences, etc.
185 Inducing persons by fraud to execute instruments.
Companies Act
Section:
47 Untrue statement or wilful false disclosure in
51(3) a prospectus
l 64(10) Concealment or misrepresentation by ofﬁcers
124 Duties and liabilities of ofﬁcers
179A Destroying or altering books, etc.
180.1 False statements or omissions in documents
374A Frauds by officer of company
3748 Books of account
374C(2) Carry on business with intent to defraud
£253) } False and misleading statements and reports
376 Dividends payable from profits 
 
 2 Securities Industry Act, 1975
i Sections
[4 Restriction on dealings by ofﬁcers
25 Concealing books relating to secun'ties
27 Establishment of stock markets
54 Short selling
58 Custody of security documents
59 Dealers trust accounts
109 False trading and market rigging
llO False and misleading statements
I ll Fraudulently inducing persons to deal in securities
| l2 Insider trading
l2] Concealing books relating to securities
Additionally, the following sections of the superseded Securities
Industries Act, 1970, should be the subject of thisjurisdiction for
comity reasons. ;
70 False trading and markets
71 Market rigging
72 Affecting market prices by ﬁctious transactions
73 False and misleading statements about marketable
securities.
7.7 Crimes Act
Sections
l78C Obtaining credit by fraud
185A Fraudulent arrangements
 
Companies Act
Section:
86 Contravening provisions of the Act relating to interests
other than shares or debentures
[63 Director failing in his duty relating to the keeping of
accounts
180W Breach of take-over code
374F(2) Ofﬁcer destroying books, etc., with intent to defraud
374G Frauds by ofﬁcers. 
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Securities Industry Act. 1975
Section
12(6) Failure to comply with orders.
7.8 . .. Common Law offence of conspiracy to cheat and defraud...
79 (a). . . the general category of forgery offences and, particularly,
the following offences created by the Crimes Act:
5.252 - Forgeries not specially provided for.
5.256 - Transfer of certain stock, or power of attorney relating
thereto.
5.257 - Personating owner of stock or property.
5.258 - Falsifying books of public funds.
5.259 - Public servant making false divident warrants, etc.
s.259 - Forging deeds.
5.273 - Forging bills, notes or orders, receipts for goods, etc.
5.274 - Signing bill. note, etc., by procuration without
authority.
5.275 - Obliterating crossings on cheques.
5.276 - Forging debentures.
5.292 - Forging instruments made evidence by statute.
(b) Perjury and false swearing(Crimes Act, sections 327, 330 and
339) )
The condition referred to in paragraph 7.10 was that the offences enumerated
in 7.9 should be included if but only if the accused person is, in the same
proceedings, also‘ charged with an offence of the kind referred to in,
paragraphs 7.4, 7.7, 7.8 or 11.6.
13.5 Cont. That such offences be listed in Schedules to the Crimes Act with
provision for subsequent amendment ofsuch Schedules without the necessity
for further legislation (See paragraphs 9.4 and 10.1).
13.6 That three new substantive offences be created:
0 Obtaining a ﬁnancial advantage by fraud.
0 Director or ofﬁcer defrauding a company or members of the
public.
0 Defrauding members of the public by means of fraudulent
schemes.
That the maximum penalty in respect of such offences be penal servitude for
ten years.
That such new offences also be subject to Supreme Court summary trial (seeparagraphs 11.6 and 11.7). 
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13.7 That the maximum penalty for the offences created by sections 173-176
(inclusive), 256-258 (inclusive) and 272 of the Crimes Act be reduced from
penal servitude for fourteen years to penal servitude for ten years whether
such offences are dealt with on indictment or summarily by a Supreme Court
Judge (see paragraph 8.3).
13.8 That the maximum penalties for all offences dealt with summarily by a
Supreme Court Judge be the same as those applicable where the offences are
dealt with on indictment (see paragraph 8.2).
13.9 That the Supreme Court (Summary Jurisdiction) Act. 1967, with
necessary consequential amendments, be utilized for the purpose of dealing
with such summary proceedings (see paragraph 6).
. 13.10 That all remaining differences between felonies and misdemeanours be
' abolished so as to allow them to be joined in the one indictment (See
paragraph 11.1 (1)). '
i 13.11 That an auditor be included within the definition of an “ofﬁcer" of a
' company for the purposes of the Crimes Act (see paragraph 11.1 (2)).
13.12 That any person who acts as a director be included within the definition
ofa “director" in both the Crimes Act and the Companies Act (see paragraph1
11.1 (3)). 
13.13 That a proprietary company be included within the deﬁnition of “body
" corporate” for the purposes of the Crimes Act (see paragraph 11.1 (4)).
13.14 That the necessary consequential amendments be made to the Crimes
j ' Act (see paragraph 10.1).
13.15 That the recommendations made in the Report apply to charges
already pending as at the date oftheir legislative implementation (paragraph
12.1): provided however, that no retrospective operation is proposed for the
r recommendations made in paragraphs 11.1 (2), (3) and (4) and 11.6 (see
paragraph 12.2).”
In relation to the only respect in which Mr. Court and Mr. Kinchington
disagreed — namely whether the Crown should have a right of appeal to the
Court of Criminal Appeal against the acquittal of an accused person — I
accepted the view expressed by Mr. Court. in all other respects [agreed with
the recommendations made in the Report.
On 7th November, 1978, [tabled the Report in the Legislative Assembly
and at the time made a short Ministerial Statement in the following terms:
“1 table the Report of the Criminal Law Review Division on summary
prosecution in the Supreme Court ofcorporate ‘white-collar’ offences of
an economic nature. In doing so 1 shall make a brief statement.
The Report is the result of considerable research by Mr. Roger Court, 
the Director of the Division; and Mr. Barry Kinchington, a Crown
Prosecutor. In preparing this Report. Mr. Court and Mr. Kinchington
have had the beneﬁt of advice from the Chief Justice and a number of
other prominent lawyers in the ﬁeld.
The recommendations in the Report have not yet been considered or
adopted by the Government.
It is now tabled so that we might have the beneﬁt of public comment on
this important matter."
  
  
 
 
PRESENTATION OF PAPER
The Honourable Frank Walker. LL. M.. M. P.
My somewhat technical background paper deals with the details of the
Report by Roger Court and Barry Kinchington on Summary Prosecution of
corporate offenders. That Report was tabled in the Parliament last October
and was widely circulated during November. A series of Bills are presently
before the Parliament in much the same form as that recommended in the
Report. However, despite its wide circulation the Report until now has
generated almost no interest. Some two hundred barristers were circulated
with copies ofthe report, all Queens Counsel, all Juniors that we thought had
an interest in the criminal law, and only two submitted comments on the
report to me. Some seven judges also assisted with comments. four District
Court and three Supreme Court judges, including the Chief Justice.
In the hope of giving the contents of the Bill and the Report wider
circulation amongst those involved in law enforcement Ichose the Report as
the subject of this paper. In the past few days however the matter has raised
some interest in legal circles, and I understand that it has received some
consideration by the Bar Council. and the Society of Labor Lawyers. But the
single aspect that has caused concern by those who were motivated to
comment upon it was, of course, the question of the abolition ofjuries. That
might only be a single matter but it is germaine and fundamental to the whole
Bill.
I propose new to develop the government‘s reasons for deciding that
juries were no longer appropriate in such cases. In doing so [am afraid [am
under a considerable disadvantage. At the moment there are two majortrails
of alleged corporate offences presently before the Supreme Court and I must,
of course. meticulously avoid any reference whatsoever to those cases.
The simple answer why juries are not appropriate in cases involving
major corporate frauds is that our system of trial byjury has evolved over the
centuries to deal with traditional or “street” crime. It is a wonderful system —
I think there is none better in the world —- and I would passionately ﬁght to
avoid its abolition in respect of those offences, but I am afraid that it
completely breaks down when it tries to deal with the more sophisticated.
complicated and complex offenders and offences of the twenty first century
and, particularly. so far as corporate and security offences are concerned. I
believe that there are a great many irresistible arguments to support that
contention.
. To understand the immensity of the problem I will present you with an
imaginary case. It is hard to evolve such a case because there have only been
two or three before the courts in our history, all of them recent, and they have
been very small by comparison with the ones that are in the wings at the
moment. I will endeavour to construct my imaginary model from some facts
in past cases and from some imagination, but it is an extreme case. On the
other hand, it is far from unreal and it is very likely to occur.
 
 l9
The case [envisage involves a group ofcompanies ofsay twenty to thirty
corporate entities. They are registered in. say, three states in Australia; New
South Wales, Victoria. and Tasmania. The allegations by the Crown involve
some one hundred breaches of our Companies and Securities Acts. and in
addition several breaches ofthe Crimes Acr. mostly in the form ofconspiracy
charges. The sums of money involved are so great that one may argue as to the
total amount. but they certainly exceed SlO million. Several thousand
transactions could be relevant in the particular case and those transactions
occurred in all states of Australia and in several overseas countries. The
suspected fraud was ﬁrst discovered in 1978. A special investigation under the
Companies Act of New South Wales ensued, and after a team ofaccountants
reconstructed the books ofthis group ofcompanies overa period oftwo years,
and after special investigators took evidence on oath from some two hundred
witnesses, including people overseas. a report was given to the Attorney-
General late in 1981. The report strongly recommended prosecutions on many
counts.
The report was forwarded to a prosecution team consisting of two
Queens Counsel, four Juniors and four solicitors who worked full time on the
case. They considered it for some twelve months. During that period they
sought further investigation into a number of aspects of the evidence side of
the case. and they finally framed charges in I982. The preliminary hearing
commenced some three months later and then proceeded for some two years.
Ten thousand pages of depositions were taken and many more thousands of
pages of exhibits went before the hearing. Some witnesses were in the box for
more than twenty days. The hearing was occasionally delayed by applications
to the Supreme Court. The hearing was frequently adjourned to meet the
convenience of counsel and the magistrate who all had other commitments.
Court vacations also added to the delays.
The costs were very high. In addition to the magistrate's salary and those
of the court attendants and the sound recorders, Crown counsels’ fees alone
exceeded $3,000 a day. The cost of the solicitors also had to be borne by the
taxpayer. There were only ﬁve defendants in this particular case but they had
four sets of representation, consisting ofa Queens counsel, a Junior each and,
of course, a solicitor each: four Queens Counsel. four Juniors and four
solicitors. The daily costs of that representation was well in excess ofSS,000.
In addition, there was the cost of eight sets of daily depositions and
considerable storage and security costs. A most conservative estimate would
be a cost of $10,000 per day. Admittedly the hearing only took place on 120
days in the ﬁrst year, and some 200 days in the second year. The total cost still
exceeded on. the most conservative estimate, $3.2 million.
The magistrate was one of the most senior members of the Bench. He
had had more than ten years of experience in the most serious cases that
magistrates deal with — probably sent people to goal on many occasions for
the maximum period oftwo or three years. He had no commercial experience,
however, never having had a private practice, having come up as a Clerk of
Petty Sessions specializing in the criminal law. He was confronted with a mass
of evidence that approximated to that faced by two or three Supreme Court
judges in the history of this state in cases such as Bayer-Farmer or Rheem
 
cases. However. after valiantly dealing with that huge mass of evidence he
.found a case to answer on some fifty counts. The Crown found an indictment
and the defence sought six months delay in which to prepare a No Bill
application. As the preparation involved detailed consideration of literally
tens of thousands of pages of documents. depositions and exhibits that was
granted. The Attorney-General took a further three months to properly
, consider and then reject that application. It was now well into 1985. A further
t eight months of delay occurred when applications were made to the Supreme
3 Court for separate trails for some of the defendants. for particulars from the
i Crown and a point of law was also litigated.
It was early in 1986 when the case commenced before ajudge and jury.
This trial only took twelve months. Some of the overseas witnesses refused to
come back to Australia on a second occasion. Two of them had died in the
meantime. The case was considerably shortened by some pretty effective
management by the judge and it only took twelve months. The cost was only
Sl.5 million. The defendants had been given 3400.000 in legal aid. It was a
package deal that certainly did not amount to anything like their total costs
involved, but it meant, of course, that no other citizens in New South Wales
received legal aid during the period of that trial. the money having gone on this
one particular case. The health of two of the defendants deteriorated
markedly under the incredible strain of three years of constant litigation. The
jurors began to complain bitterly after the first month of the dislocation to
their lives. to theirjob opportunities and of the economic costs of sitting on a
jury for such a period oftime. In any event they were completely bewildered by
the legal and commercial complexities of the case. Thejury eventually retired
and considered their verdict after addresses lasting several weeks. They did
' n0t have the opportunity to take with them the thousands of pages of
documentation, transcript and exhibits. They probably could not have coped
anyway. At any event using what wisdom they had they found two of the
' . . defend'antsguilty and could not reach a decision about the other three. The
'~ two were given eight years imprisonment. They naturally appealed to the
Court of Appeal, and eventually to the High Court. One of them died before
the High Court found in their favour on a legal technicality. All five were
bankrupt by this time having spent tens and perhaps hundreds ofthousands of
dollars. ifthey had it, on their defence. The total estimated costs were over $5
million. most of which. of course, had to be paid by the taxpayer. There has to
be a better system for dealing with such cases.
In England I discussed the matter with the Director of Public
Prosecutions and asked what is done in the United Kingdom? “How do you
deal with these cases? Surely you do not go through this tremendously
complex and difficult procedure.“ The answer was simply “We do not
charge." They do not proceed against such people. The position in the United
States of America appears much the same from their law reports. There are
some very large trust cases that go on for decades, but generally speaking such
is the complexity of these matters, the difficulty of them, and the legal
problems associated with them, that the Crown simply does not proceed. So I
was faced with a terrible problem of finding a system that was better: that was
cheaper so far as the taxpayer was concerned, that placed less strain on the
prosecution; and more importantly less strain on the accused.   
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I think that the system that was presented in the report by Roger Court
and Barry Kinchington is the best that can be evolved in our present state. It is
a system that has its safeguards. It is proceeded by a special investigation
where evidence is taken on oath. It is proceeded by a preliminary hearing
whereby the accused can get full and complete particulars of the Crown case.
He can get any other information the Court sees fit to provide them with.
There is a system that provides for an appeal by way of rehearing. and it is a
system I believe that is fairer than the existing one.
I know that many of us are emotionally attached to trial by jury. l
certainly have similar emotions within me but [ simply am faced with a
situation where the criminal justice system has broken down in trying to
attempt to deal with these cases. The taxpayer‘s pocket cannot be expected to
stretch that far. The legal aid system is totally inadequate and it is completely
unfair to take all that money and give it to one particular defendant where
there are literally thousands of other accused people deserving of assistance.
Therefore, I have before the Parliament a Bill that provides for Summary
Trial. I would hope that it would develop into a specialistjurisdiction with
skilled judges who can fully understand the commercial complexities of these
cases and I would hope that it would result in a high standard ofjustice.
The penalities are certainly much lower. The maximum penalty under
this Bill is ten years imprisonment and I would hope that it would be a
proposition that would be accepted generally within the community. There
will be individuals, of course, who will not agree with it. but I am afraid that
those purists really cannot come up with another answer. There are some that
suggest that you can amend the Companies and Securities laws. but the sort of
amendments put to me are more draconian than abolishing thejury system. l
think it is the only answer.
f" _..__.. .
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WHITE-COLLAR CRIME .
Professor Gilbert L. Geis
Program in Social Ecology. University of California
Visiting Professor, University of Sydney
Speaking at the 100th anniversary meeting of the Los Angeles Bar
Association in May, 1978, the President of the United States use
d the
imprimatur of his ofﬁce to signify white-collar crime asa paramount national
social and economic problem. There was unconscious, or perhaps deliberate,
irony in the fact that the President's stress on white-collar crime appeared in a
speech that primarily was a critique of the legal profession. “We are
overlawyered and underrepresented”, the President maintained. “No resource
of talent and training in our society, not even medical care, is more wastefully
or unfairly distributed than legal skills". Later, the President made his points
about white-collar crime:
‘ Powerful white-collar criminals cheat consumers of millions ofdollars.
‘ Public officials who abuse their high rank damage the integrity of our
nation in profound and long-lasting ways. But too often these big-shot
crooks escape the consequences of their acts.
‘ Justice must be blind to rank, power and position.’
Had the President chosen to move deeper into delicate territory, at the
risk of further aggravating attorneys, he might have pointed out that one of
the surest guarantees of unmolested white—collar lawbreaking is the ability to
command high-priced legal talent. Such talent can lobby partisan measures
into law for corporate clients, can delay trial outcomes, obfuscate issues, and
overwhelm government attorneys by pouring huge sums into trials. Members
of ﬁrms with corporate clients would counter-attack. of course, by pointing
out that in a democracy everybody, including corporations and professional
persons, is entitled to adequate legal services. That the richest get the best is
axiomatic. What else is new? Who had ever claimed thatjustice isn’t in part a
commodity, able to be purchased, like everything else, in the marketplace?
A tone of urgency was clear in Mr Carter‘s Los Angeles speech. “The
Justice Department", he announced. “is undertaking a major new effort on
white-collar crime“. Officials in the Department of Justice charged with
prosecuting white-collar crime. however. at a meeting I was attending in
Washington shortly after the President‘s speech, responded with wonderment
to his message. They had received no mandate, much less any resources. to
deal more effectively with white-collar crime. At the same meeting, officials
from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration announced that funds
for research and action projects in the area of white-collar crime would be
reduced in the coming fiscal year as part of an overall agency budget cut.
White-collar crime once again was making for fine political populist
  1. L03 Ange/es Times. [9 May 1978
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rhetoric. but the words were not being translated into public policy. This is
traditionally the manner that Americans deal with white-collar crime. It
allows those of us who are doing well to castigate lawbreakers who are like us
in social status. without threatening them so seriously that it would make us
nervous too.
Tax Fraud
Note. in this regard. the US. Department of Commerce‘s recent
statement that $l6.3 billion more was paid out by banks in interest and $2.9
billion more in dividends than was reported by taxpayers to the lnternal
Revenue Service.2 The loss to the Government may be close to or exceed the
take from those street crimes that arouse so much anger and concern. But the
Treasury Department is complacent. It will not beef up enforcement efforts
because that could, a Treasury press release observes. “generate taxpayer
resentment so great as tojeopardize the very foundation ofthe entire system of
voluntary compliance“. The doublespeak involved in noting the huge amount
of tax fraud. while describing the tax system as one of “voluntary
compliance" is ludicrous, though its humor might be lost on burglars and
shoplifters. among others. The moral of the Treasury statement is that if
enough powerful persons are crooks their potential unhappiness at election
time if they are prosecuted will guarantee them immunity from enforcement
efforts.
Street and Suite Crime
The difference in ofﬁcial responses to criminal acts of the “haves" in
contrast to those ofthe “have-nots“ produces further problems. I believe that
the failure of the American criminal justice system to mount an effective
campaign against street offenders is largely a function of the fact that
prosecutors. judges. and the rest of us know too well that a vast amount of
criminal activity by middle and upperclass persons is largely ignored. We
cannot find the anger to allow us to say of lower—class, largely minority group
offenders: “These are the real evil people; they deserve to be punished in order
to protect the rest of us, the good people". Most of us are too aware not to
know better than that.
We also have trouble really thinking of the successful as the malevolent.
Federal prosecutors gathering evidence against Spiro Agnew. when he was
Vice—President of the United States, demonstrated the change in
psychological set needed to cauterize deep rooted feelings about who the
“proper“ criminals are. Newspaper reporters describing the Agnew
investigation display their biases in the quotation below when they indicate
that somehow it is worse to prosecute a “respectable“ crook than a lower class
crook:
Men under investigation [in the Agnew case] were called “bad
men . . . In a way, the prosecutors employed terms like these to
condition themselves for the job at hand — mean, nasty work that often
Wall Street Journal, 4 June l978
 
  
   
entailed sending a man tojail. It was one thing to dispose ofa mugger in
that fashion. but quite another thing when it came to men much like
themselves - college educated. middle class articulate. There were not
street people. but men with roots in the community. The humiliation of
jail was total and absolute. It destroyed families, careers, and then men
themselves.J
The major difference between white-collar criminals and the traditional
street offenders probably is that the burglar and the robber have more limited
means at their disposal for law violation. Members of both groups are
dishonest, but the white-collar crook can be more subtle (and more efficient)
in his criminal self—aggrandizement. As Neil Shover has noted:
The members of the underclass command so few resources that. when
engaging in criminality, they must rely upon stealth. guile or frontal
assaults on property to attain their objectives. Not so for elites, whose
resources include the bureaucratized labor power of others; elites can,
therefore, use bureaucracies as instruments for the perpetuation oftheir
criminal ends. Control over organizations. as resources, thus becomes a
kind of functional equivalent of the underclass bandit’s pistol.‘
The use of indirection and manipulation common in white—collar crime
can be far more dangerous to a country's integrity than direct forms of
criminal activity. Muggings and other street crimes tend to unite a people in
moral condemnation of an outsider. Emile Durkheim, a French sociologist,
emphasized that such acts may make people behave better by dramatizing
what we abhor and by showing what happens to people who behave in such
ways. White-collar crime, on the contrary, breeds social malaise. It creates
distrust, cynicism, and greed — if others are doing it, I'll get my share too.
Street criminals cite ,self-righteously the derelictions of those in more
fortunate positions than themselves. Such considerations led Jonathan Swift
to set forth in the land visited by Gulliver a penal policy that punished white-
collar offenses more harshly than common thefts:
The Lilliputians look upon fraud as a greater crime than theft, and
therefore seldom fail to punish it with death; for they allege that care and
vigilance, with a very common understanding, may preserve a man‘s
goods from theft, but honesty has no defense against superior cunning.
It is sometimes maintained that white-collar crime ought not to be
regarded seriously because, at its worst, it involves only money, while street
offenses can threaten life and limb. Such a distinction is spurious. Smogging
and mugging are not that distinctive in their lethal consequences. It is quite
possible that more people have died from corporate conducted or corporate
condoned violence — involved in things such as the knowing manufacture of
3. Richard M. Cohen and Jules Witcover. A Heartbeat Away, Viking Press, N.Y.. 1974, p.71
4. Neal Shover, Organizations and Interorganizational Field: as Crimogenic Behaviour
Sellings: Notes on the Concept Organizational Crime, Dept. of Sociology. University of
Tennessee. I976. p. l2.  
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defective cars and private planes — than have been victims of more
traditional
kinds of murder.
The roster of unnecessary deaths of workers in the asbestos indust
ry in
the United States documents fatal consequences of white-co
llar crime.
Epidemiological studies indicate that asbestos workers died from
lung cancer
at unconscionably higher rates than workers in other industrie
s. A union
official, fighting for enforcement of tougher industry standards,
put the
matter bluntly. “I wanted them to know that murder was being comm
itted in
the workplace". Paul Brodeur, investigating conditions in factori
es, often
found them a mockery of the assumption that the government wou
ld force
companies to abide by standards set to insure healthful working co
nditions.
Brodeur has summarized pointedly the bias shown by responses to t
he heavy
death toll among asbestos workers:
I submit that if a million people in the so-called middle or professional
class were dying each decade of preventable occupational disease. and if
nearly four million were being disabled, there would long ago have been
such a hue and cry for remedial action that if Congress had not heeded it
vast numbers of its members would have been turned out of ofﬁce.’
For much corporate crime, however, a usual punishment is a consent
order in which the accused in essence says: “I didn't do it, but I won't do it
again”. The United States Security and Exchange Commission settles about
90 percent of the 160 or so cases it brings each year with consent decrees.
Burglars might wish they had it so good.
There is also a process at work reminiscent of the compensation
programs of medieval times. Victims often much prefer to pursue civil suits,
where they can recover monetary damages, rather than to press criminal
charges, where their gain will be no more than moral satisfaction. Thus,
offending corporations can at times literally buy off their victims.
Failure to attend to white-collar crime adequately most certainly is
partly rooted in the congruity between offenders and those charged with the
cn'mes' prosecution. But the basic explanation seems more complicated.
Suzanne Weaver6 in a recent study of discretion in prosecuting federal
antitrust violators found government attorneys intent upon nailing corporate
violators. It was not political interference, she came to believe, that kept actual
prosecutions low, but rather the inability to construct airtight cases that could
go forward successfully. The same situation seemed characteristic of
Australian investigators for Corporate Affairs Commissions with whom I
discussed this matter in Bathurst last month. They also felt that the penalties
possible in this country often were so low, compared to the illicit gains, that
the cases were not worth pursuing, despite patent violations of a law.
5. Paul Brodeur. Expendable Americans. Viking Press. N.Y., 1974. p. 274
6. Suzanne Weaver, Decision to Prosecute: Organization and Public Policy in the Antitrust
Division. M,I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass. [977.
; It has proved exceedingly difﬁcu
lt to place responsibility for white-
: collar crimes. Corporate ofﬁcials in the
United States have learned well to rely
on verbal communications of illegal plots ra
ther than to keep written records.
We are reluctant to hold a person criminally re
sponsible for an act unless we
can show the proper mens rea, or guilty inten
t. We will not accept a parallel to
Thomas Aquinas' reasoning that heresy wa
s a sin punishable by criminal
action because such a degree of ignorance
could only be the product of
culpable negligence. l enthusiastically suppo
rt the provision of the proposed
United States federal criminal code, that org
anizational ofﬁcials be regarded
as having behaved “recklessly" if they did not
put a stop to criminal activities
in groups for which they were administrativ
ely responsible, when they ought
to have known about such crimes if they had ac
ted with reasonable and proper
care. Today, a legal structure largely erected to
protect political dissidents and
2 street offenders probably redounds more
to the advantage of white-collar
i criminals than members of either of the t
wo other groups. The task is made
more difficult by the fact that the mass media
do not attend very well to the
activities of corporations. Tom Wicker of the
New York Times, for example,
i has noted that huge corporations are the m
ost glaring example ofinstitutional
forces in the 1970‘s which have been “l
ittle scrutinized and mostly
' unchallenged in p
rint or on the airwaves”. The absence of satis
factory media
I coverage of corpo
rations is particularly troublesome if one agre
es with R H
Tawney’s observation that “the man who emplo
ys governs. He occupies what
is really a public ofﬁce”.
|
I
i That the issue of “intent"
is susceptible to novel approaches in order to
i ' reach ascendant social goals
and to combat white-collar crime is indicated by
' an Indiana grand jury indictment
of the Ford Motor Company on three
I counts of reckless homicide
and one count of criminal recklessness.7 The
‘ " charges, said to be unprecedented
in the United States, were based on a section
of the state criminal code enacted in 1977. The indictment speciﬁed
that Ford
i failed to repair and modify
the Pinto to rectify fuel tank safety problems, and
I to warn the public of what was
called the car’s “dangerous tendency . . . to
. burn upon rear-end impact”. Charges
were laid as a consequence of the deaths
I of three young women in a Pinto
automobile crash in August, 1978. The car
i model in which the victims died
had been recalled earlier in the summer
l because of government complaints
about its faulty fuel tank. Penalties on
conviction under the Indiana law could be ﬁnes of$10,000 on each
ofthe three
1 felony counts and $5,000 on the
misdemeanor count.
i
|
The Indiana approach, placing ﬁscal responsibility on a corporate body,
recoilects early English laws that specified that the citizens of a tow
n must
, reimburse a man robbed within the town'
s boundaries for his losses unless the
! thief was apprehended in a speciﬁed time. The twi
n presumptions were that
the obligation would provide incentive for effective law enforcemen
t, and
would spread the victim’s loss among a larger group. The manner in
which a
penalty such as that possible under the Indiana statute is redistribute
d seems
even less likely than the medieval custom to encourage law abiding c
itizens.
 
Perhaps a major strength of an approach such as that of Indiana lies in
7. Stale v Ford Motor Company Elkhart Superior Court. Indiana, Cause
no. 5324)
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the “shame“ that falls upon a corporate entity convicted of acts such as
“reckless homicide" and “criminal recklessness". Shame, or labelling as the
criminologists are wont to call it, may be much more effective in squaring
away corporate conduct than it seems to be in inhibitingjuvenile delinquency.
Anecdotal evidence suggests, however, that in some instance a wrongdoer
label can prove advantageous in the corporate world. Anthony Sampson3
reports that I‘I'I‘ ofﬁcials believed that an antitrust scandal had been of
particular assistance in their campaign to achieve corporate identity. Public
relations men believed that people would soon forget what the publicity was
about; they would just remember the letters ITT. On the other hand, the
company’s stock dropped more than one billion dollars in value during the
period of the antitrust concern.
Public concern with white—collar crime rarely proceeds beyond a few
transient outbursts of indignation. The harm from white—collar offenses tends
to be highly diffuse, with losses scattered among many persons, each of whom
bears only a very small portion of the total. An orangejuice manufacturer can
water his product and cheat each of us out of only a few cents a year and reap
millions of dollars in criminal proﬁt. We also have become callous about
marketplace deception. We expect to be cheated, and feel impotent about
protecting ourselves. We know that some auto mechanics, television
repairmen, and other tradespeople are routinely ripping us off. We are not
surprised to learn from a recent newspaper headline that fraud in United
States federal programs is estimated to be about $12 billion annually. We have
become numbed and overwhelmed, and we don't know what to do about it—
so we sometimes try not to seem to care.
Medical White-Collar Crime
We are also puzzled to understand the roots of white-collar crime in a
manner that will allow us to control it. We know that it does not stem from
broken homes, or Oedipal conﬂicts, or similiar platitudinous explanations
offered for traditional offenses.
We know, for instance, that the recent rise in the income of doctors in
the United States has outpaced the rate for all professions; that the average net
earnings of a doctor is now about $65,000. Yet medical law breaking seems
almost endemic. An early study by Howard Whitman’ described widespread
medical fee splitting, and newspapers document relentlessly, almost
monotonously, criminal practices by doctors. These involve not only ﬁnancial
fraud, but also crimes against the person, such as unwarranted surgery, which
reasonably might be deﬁned as assault. In addition, trepidation in United
States government circles about medical ﬁscal veniality likely has inhibited
earlier establishment ofa national health service, to the physical detriment of
large segments of the population.
8. Anthony Sampson, The Sovereign State of [77‘ Stein and Day, N.Y., I974, pp. 299-300
9 $5023“ Whitman, “Why Some Doctors Should be in Jail" Colliers. 132 (30 Oct. I953) pp.
 28
The litany of medical crime —— and doctors may well be among the more
honest professionals in our midst — can be brieﬂy sampled to make the case
more speciﬁc. The American College of Surgeons has alleged that half ofthe
operations performed in American hospitals are done by unqualiﬁed
doctors.'° A Government lawsuit maintained that the 4,500 doctors who own
and work in medical laboratories overcharged the public for tests and
conspired illegally to keep everyone but themselves out of the medical
laboratory business.ll In 1970, the Internal Revenue Service reported that
about half of the 3,000 doctors who received $25,000 or more in Medicare or
Medicaid payments failed to report a substantial amount oftheir income.’2 A
1976 study by Cornell University investigators found that from 11 to l3
percent of all surgery in the United States is “unnecessary”, a function of
diagnostic incompetence or greed stemming from a lust for high surgical fees.
The Cornell researchers believed that about two million or more operations
each year were unwarranted.
A later survey reported that most unnecessary surgery was performed
on Medicaid patients. The self righteousness of violators is reﬂected in a
statement by two New York doctors, who told investigators that government
programs “encouraged" them to cheat, since they were not monitored
properly. What are the roots of such behavior and such attitudes? Perhaps we
dare not look too closely, lest we uncover conclusions too painful and
unnerving.
Ralph Nader’s Work
No consideration of white-collar cn'me would be complete without
reference to the work of Ralph Nader and his associates. Nader’s underlying
philosophy is preeminently clear. Like Lord Acton, he believes that power
tends to corrupt and absolute power to corrupt absolutely. The duty of the
citizen, as Nader views it, is to see to it that a keen eye is kept upon
government, business, and the professions, the major locales of power, so that
they fulfil their public obligations.
Investigation of the work of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
by a Nader study group demonstrates how Nader and his colleagues come to
grips with white-collar offenses. They rely primarily upon (I) research; (2) use
of legal processes; and (3) publicity. The legal process is employed, along with
other methods, to make certain that the investigators are accorded access to
relevant materials. Research undergirds their case, and publicity hits at the
upperworld’s special sensitivity to notoriety.
The Nader team, as noted, work on the premise that industry will take
advantage of virtually any opportunity to exploit the consuming public, and
Will desnst from such exploitation only when forced to do so by government
ID. New York Times. 4 Oct., l96l. Compare with “Unnecessary surgery remains a
‘monumental problem' for the public despite effons over the past three years to curb it.“
the US. House interstate and Foreign Commerce sub-committee reported late in 1978.
Wall Street Journal. 27 Dec.. 1978.
ll. New York Times. 7 July, I966.
l2. New York Times, 3 May, 1976.
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organizations goaded into action by the pressure of public opinion. The
focus
of the Nader work, therefore, has been on documentation of the f
ailure of
federal and state regulatory agencies to control practices which Congress
gave
them the power to regulate.
The Nader survey of the FDA, for instance, begins with an overview of
the food industry, which, according to Nader, has become concentrated into
“fewer and fewer corporate hands", with the following result:
The competition, such as it is, has focused heavily on massive
promotional expenditures (between 16 and IB percent of gross
revenues), on brand name identiﬁcation, wasteful nonprice comp-
etition, and other marketing expenses that do not provide added value
for the consumer but simply increase food prices. In addition. the food
companies have one of the tiniest research budgets (for nutrition and
food quality) of any United States industry.”
The probe into the work of the FDA, conducted largely by college
students and recent graduates, found that, rather than launch campaigns
against major ﬁrms that routinely break the law, the FDA pursues small and
inconsequential violators, so as to give the appearance of activity with a
record ofsuccessful prosecution, while allowing major depredators to proceed
unmolested. Even when successful, as in the following case, the FDA is
hampered by an archaic penalty structure:
In 1958 the FDA became involved in a complicated legal battle with the .
Caltec Citrus Company after having staked out the company’s
warehouse and observed sugar, vitamin C, and other substances not
allowed in pure orange juice being carried in a back door. It was
estimated that the watering and adulterating practices of the company ~
cost consumers $1 million in lost value —- $1 million of pure company
proﬁts. The outcome of the case . . . was a total time of $6,000, and a
suspended sentence for the violators. A man who could return $1 million
on a $6,000 investment would be considered brilliant in any business
circle."
Nonetheless, the Nader team was not convinced that limited
enforcement power was the primary handicap of the FDA; if the agency
allowed the public to be bilked, the cause was its own apathy and indifference.
“As long as the FDA believes that the food industry wishes to provide the
safest, highest quality food possible to the American people“, the team
concluded, “no amount of legislation, manpower, or money will turn the
agency into an effective food regulator". The Nader group found the FDA‘s
faith in industrial self regulation “ludicrous, if not tragic". The food industry,
it insisted, “has vigourously set about its task of making profits". Therefore, it
was time that the FDA set about “its assigned task of insuring that profits
made by the food industry are not the result offraud, deception, adulteration,
13 James S.‘ Turner. The Chemical Feast, Grossman, N.Y., I970. Ralph Nader
“Introduction" p. vii.
14 Ibid. p. 63
 
30
or misbranding". Otherwise, the public interest will continue to be mauled by
the food industry's “callousness. ignorance, and greed".
Signiﬁcance of White-Collar Crime
White-collar crime is an area of work that may be able to throw light on
some of the most signiﬁcant aspects of contemporary life. Among the topics
work on white-collar crime may illuminate, the following seem notable in
that:
l. White-collar crime challenges the more banal kinds of explanations of
criminal activity. To say that poverty “causes" crime, for instance, fails
utterly to account for widespread lawbreaking by persons who are
extraordinarily afﬂuent.
2. White-collar crime indicates the distribution of power in our society. An
examination of the statute books shows what kinds of occupational acts
have come to be included within the criminal code and what kind go
unproscribed. The enactment of laws curbing the activities of certain
persons demonstrates that, at least for a moment, other persons with
other interests had the power to prevail legislatively.
3. White-collar crime portrays the manner in which power is exercised in
our society. A review of upperworld violations and the manner in which
they are prosecuted and punished tells who is able to control what in
American society and indicates the extent to which such control is
effective.
4. White-collar crime provides an indication of the degree of hypocrisy
present in a society. Such hypocrisy may be seen as leverage by means of
which the society may be forced toward congruence between its verbal
commitments and its actual conduct, much as Myrdal” insisted that the
“dilemma" in the United States between conduct toward minorities and
democratic values exerted incessant pressure for a reconciliation along
' ~ the lines of the values. in regard to white-collar crimes, hypocrisy exists
when fraud among the lower classes is viewed with distaste and
punished. while upper-class deception is countenanced and defined as
nothing more malevolent than “shrewd business practice".
5. White-collar crime illustrates changes in social and business life. Thus,
the old-time grocer, weighing merchandise by hand and dealing with
customers on a personal basis, probably had less inclination and less
opportunity to defraud. Today‘s supermarkets, engaged essentially in
the rental of shelf space to manufacturers, epitomize impersonality, with
consequences for the emergence of a new form of crime, that involving
consumer fraud.
6. White-collar crime furnishes material helpful for an understanding of
changes in social values. Recent laws demanding that foods be 15 Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma. Harper. N.Y., l944
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uncontaminated and that pollution be controlled re
flect an emerging
ethos insisting that persons be accorded every reasonable o
pportunity to
remain alive and healthy until cut down by uncontrollabl
e forces. In the
future, if support grows for enunciation of the right ofeach
human being
to achieve his or her full potential, new forms of white—c
ollar crime will
be legislated.
Stigma and Status
There are two particular problems regarding white-
collar crime that
may be illuminated by insights from the social-psych
ological literature. These
concern (1) how the white-collar offender fails
to perceive the seriousness of
his act; and (2) how others around the white-collar of
fender fail to appreciate
the act's seriousness.
l. White-collar offenders usually deny, distort. de
fuse or deflect the
reasonable interpretations of their criminal behavior. Bu
sinessmen, for
example, claim that there is a “very ﬁne line” between law
violations and
acceptable business practice. Physicians claim that the
border between
incompetence resulting in an unfavorable malpractic
e verdict or a
criminal charge and reasonable professionaljudgment is
similarly gray.
One of the most consistent findings is the essentially no
ncriminal self~
concept of the white-collar offender, regardless of the occupat
ional
context in which his behavior takes place.
There are at least two major reasons for this failure of the
offender to
think of himself as a criminal, or, in sociological terms, to b
e “labelled".
First, the legal process, with its usual inattention to
white-collar crime,
reinforces the idea that this is not serious behavi
or. In addition, the
offender must undergo a process of dissonance reductio
n based on the
fact that his social roles are valued and “respectable“ —
community
leader, member of the Parents and Teachers‘ Asso
ciation, a Rotarian,
good family provider, respected citizen, on the board of dir
ectors of the
local hospital, active in the political arena, and so on. Obviou
sly, roles
such as these are not consistent with the appellation “crim
inal“.
2. White-collar crimes do not generate substantial pu
blic outrage and
concern. Nor are the careers of white-collar offenders much
changed if
they are prosecuted for law breaking. Of the ﬁfteen persons who
were
ﬁred from General Electric in the wake of heavy equipment
antitrust
prosecutions, twelve were reemployed at higher levels elsewh
ere. Within
several months after his release fromjail, one former G.E. em
ployee was
named president ofa large corporation. Some ofthese person
s may have
been fearful about their lives after release from incarceration,
but their
apprehensions were unfounded. Similarly, a study of f
ifty-eight
physicians losing malpractice suits found that none reported
negative
effects on their practice, and ﬁve actually reported an e
xpanded
practice. The heaviest financial loser also had the largest
gain in
practice. He thought that other physicians felt sorry for him
and had
increased their rate of referrals. 
 r__‘____ ,___ .
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Punishment Response
' Difficult issues arise in regard to the most effective manner of dealing
i with convicted white-collar criminals. It might be argued that white-collar
criminals should not be imprisoned, that the shame they reap is punishment
enough. Such an attitude underlies the recent bevy of “creative" sentences
imposed by judges on white-collar offenders. Recently, for instance, the Olin
Corporation pleaded nole contenders (How many burglars are allowed to
plead nole contendere?) to a charge of illegally selling arms to South Africa.
For punishment, the corporation was ordered to donate $510,000 to charity.
Olin seemed enthusiastic about the outcome: it could deduct the contributions
from its taxes (which it could not have done were it fined). and it would gather
a bit of goodwill as it spread about its largesse.l6
An argument against imprisoning white-collar crooks is that often they
are professional persons. and they may be barred from practicing their
vocation, although professional groups, such as bar, medical, and
accountants‘ associations, often seem much more concerned with protecting
prerogatives than with disciplining offenders.
I believe that we need to make an example of white-collar criminals in
order to deter others and to restore faith in the justice and fairness of the
criminal justice system. “Crimes in the suites” needs to be treated with the
same severity or more severely than “crime in the streets”.
I think there is a need for the government to launch a campaign designed
to spotlight the horrors of white-collar crime and the inequities rampant in the
manner in which we deal with such crime. Such acampaign demands thunder
and lightning. The law is a powerful instrument to condition morality, at least
.. , within limits, but Solzhenitsyn'7 is correct too when he notes that we in the
united States tend to use the fact that we have stayed just within legal
boundaries ——- or that we can make such a case — or that at least they can‘t
prove a contrary case — as ajustiﬁcation for unacceptable behavior. We have
got to tighten laws so that ultimately they create a reﬂexive honesty and
compassion, rather than having them represent no more than a catalogue of
the most nefarious behavior that might, if uncovered, get their perpetrator
into legal trouble.
Offenders must come to know that callous commercial exploitation of
their fellow human beings is beyond the pale. [appreciate that such a demand
smacks of preaching and that preaching is declasse these days: we are all cool
and tolerant and cynical. We expect the worst and then cannot be
disappointed. We recognize within ourselves those impulses which prompted
the acts of the depredators. We see the reformer merely using issues for self-
advancement. I think the time is overdue for some oldfashioned anger and
moralizing in regard to white-collar crime and criminals. They have got to
learn that what they have done or are doing is wrong, that it threatens this
16 Wall Street Journal. 31 March, I978
17 Aglexander Solzhenitsyn, “The Wests Decline in Courage” Wall Street Journal. 13 June.
I 78, p. 20   
 
 
33
country's survival in a very real way, and that we will not put up with it.
Rationalizations — “everybody does it“ is one of the more common — must
be penetrated.
I think meetings such as this are essential, because arousal of public and
professional concern is a fundamental need if we are going to make inroads
against white-collar crime. From this concern must come recommendations
and support for remediation. There should be a major governmental agency
to spotlight and coordinate a campaign against white-collar crime.
Centralized statistical reports ought to be issued to demonstrate the extent
and the nature of such offenses. The media ought to be encouraged to carry
stories of white-collar crime where they carry all crime news, and not in the
business pages adjacent to the stock reports. Extensive structural changes
ought to be made to render corporations more responsible: In Australia, I
think a federal incorporation law ought to replace diverse State laws; public
representatives ought to ﬁnd their way onto Boards of Directors; and
stockholders ought to be made more vigilant, or to sufferthe consequences of
heavy criminal penalties against the organization they presumptively partially
own.
I believe that white-collar criminals are more culpable than their street
counterparts. Having more advantages than other people. they bear more
responsibility to establish a good example. This idea of noblesse oblige
dictates that white-collar criminals do more prison time more often than street
offenders for equivalent depredations. White-collar offenders are notably
deterrable: guilt and shame (at being caught) are qualities that are part oftheir
upbringing.
Whatever the proper approach to white-collar crime. nobody
examining the facts can fail to be convinced that the phenomenon requires
more attention than it currently receives from the public, the media, attorneys,
criminologists, legislators, and government ofﬁcials. White—collar crime in
every sense is real crime. It has been overlooked and underplayed for far too
long.
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PRESENTATION OF PAPER
Professor Gilbert Gets
My formal remarks are largely conﬁned of necessity and by experience
to the American scene. but it seems to me essential that lat least try to respond
on the basis of a very limited exposure to what strikes me as a germaine
question:-— How relevant are my remarks to contemporary Australia?
Nothing has convinced me that what is true of America in regard to
white-collar crime is less true for the Australian scene. Irender these opinions
very tentatively and with a good deal of the kind of respect that ought to come
from an alien with limited experience in the indigenous setting. But I think the
penalty structure for white-collar crime in Australia is probably less adequate
than it is in the United States, and that many cases of corporate and white-
collar offences are often abandoned because the costs of prosecution. as the
Attorney-General has indicated, are so overwhelming and the penalties so
mild that it is not worth proceeding with the investigation and the
prosecution.
Secondly, in workplace types of offences. the workers in Australia are
no more, ifas adequately, protected as they are in the United States from what
I would consider culpable negligence on the part of persons who operate
business enterprises. Mr Justice Kirby spoke on this subject about three weeks
ago and it seems to me his remarks were perfectly on target. There is a good
deal of what I would regard as negligent manslaughter and assault as a
consequence of reckless and careless attention to the necessities of workplace
safety.
Thirdly, the corporations on the Australian scene are no more open. no
more public, no more responsive, if as responsive, as they are in the United
States. Tom Wicker has made the observation that the mass media in the
United States are notoriously inattentive to the intricate inside operations of
corporations. I think that same charge can be allegated against the Australian
mass media and perhaps doubled. The corporate structure is simply a private
enterprise and I would submit to you that it ought not to be. I believe
corporations have a profound inﬂuence on public life. They are essentially
and fundamentally public enterprises and they are obligated to be, by my
standards, open to very intensive public scrutiny. Also incorporation laws are
as heterogenous, uncoordinated, as amorphous, and as loose, in Australia as
they are in the United States.
To mention several other items: You seem to strike solicitors offthe rolls
like tenpins in Australia. My newspaper reading tells me that this is on the
basis of random checks — one shudders at the consequences of regular
checks!
Your tax structure does not seem any more equitable in the enforcement
of tax violation, or the monitoring of tax evasion than ours, and your tax
evasion through legislation seems to me about on a par with ours or certainly
no better than ours.
“
‘
"
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I sense on a more intricate kind of level that there is a tendency in‘
Australia to be slightly more protective of shareholders. not necessarily at the
expense of, but vis-a-vis, consumers. There is an understandable tendency to
move in when a corporation goes bankrupt (an occurrence which seems to
take place with some regularity, at least during the brief time that I have been
here, in a major kind of way) rather than to persistently check and monitor
and watch and scrutinize ongoing activities, instead of responding to the
ultimate kind of process which fundamentally affects primarily the
stockholders rather than the public on a continuing basis.
Lastly, I think that the Australian scene is no different than the
American scene in the sense that there is notan intense beliefthat white-collar
and corporate crime is a matter of paramount social concern. My paper
emphasises that particular “public opinion" issue. I checked the Annual
Report of the Corporate Affairs Committee. and your record is no better or
no worse. depending on your viewpoint. in regard to imprisoning corporate
offenders than the United States. In the period the report covered there were
two seven-year sentences two years ago. all the rest were what I regard as
“wrist sla ps". It might be argued that such offenders should not be imprisoned
because of the shame that occurs to them. because of the fact that they are
persons of reputation and that their reputation is damaged. That is the reason
we are beginning to see in the United States a variety of so~called “creative
sentences“. I regard them as no more than cute. other people regard them as
very advanced. I think white-collar criminals need to be made an example of
for a variety of reasons, particularly to restore faith in the fairness of the
ju5tice system and also to deter other individuals. I think they are exquisitively
sensitive to shame and punishment. I do not like either shame or punishment.
but I like even less the activities which are embraced within the rubric ofwhite-
collar crime. I think “crime in the suites", as Ralph Nader so well calls it. ought
to be treated unequivocally as crime in the streets.
I totally agree with most of the Attorney General's observation. For
example, a very elegant criminal law which has emerged (to our considerable
credit) for dealing with street offenders now is being perverted. I would like to
reﬁne the process by which white-collar crime is handled; particularly in
regard to ideas ofintent. A good corporation lawyer in the United States, (and
it is probably his obligation) will quickly conveyto clients that nothing should
be written: use the telephones, do not keep records, do not be compulsive
about documenting what does on at the stockholders‘ meetings. The link to
determine satisfactorily the mens rea of the offence is almost an impossible
link to establish. With respect to the Attorney-General, that is where I would
concentrate the major part of my attention rather than on procedural
prosecution tactics. -
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COMMERCIAL CRIME, OR BREACH OF CO
MMERCIAL
MORALITY ENVIRONMENT. REASONS AN
D A SUPPLEMENT
TO LEGISLATION
Rodney N. Purvis, F. C.A., Dip. Crim.
Barrister-at-Law.
Introduction
Having noted the subject of the paper to be delivere
d this evening by The
Honourable. The Attomey-General, “New Propos
als for Dealing with White-
Collar Crime”, and accepting, as Ido, that impleme
ntation of such proposals
are, with respect, well warranted, I thought it might
not be inappropriate to
apply my allotted time to a consideration of the env
ironment and causes of
commercial criminality.
The seeming increase of prospective accused in pro
ceedings referable to
what is often described as “white-collar crime
“ might well warrant thought
being given to a course of social conduct o
ther than that of criminal
proceedings.
A Business-Centred Society
Questions have been raised, for example,
about the integrity of
corporate earnings, about whether . . . business
is run in the best
interests of its shareholders and the larger society of
which it is a part,
about whether our equity markets are an attractive an
d fair place for the
individual investor to place his after-tax investment do
llars, and about
the inability of small business to gain vital access to ca
pital markets. The
answers to these questions are important not only t
o our economic
future, but also in terms of the respective roles whic
h government and
the private sector will play in the future shaping of ou
r economic and
social structure.‘
No group in our society is more influential than businessme
n. Their
inﬂuence for good or evil enters every life and every ho
me many times each
day. If the influence is good, the nation is strengthened.
If it is evil, the nation
is weakened.
The many decisions of businessmen signiﬁcantly dete
rmine national
health, ethical as well as economic. Many, especially the
young, imitate the
law and manners of successful businessmen.
Through personnel management, consumer relations, t
reatment of
suppliers, advertising, and other daily actions, busines
smen reinforce or
weaken human dignity.
The popular image of the businessman includes the notio
n that he is
relatively unethical. In a survey reported in Newsweek
“What Americans
1. Williams. “Corporate Accountability and the Lawyer's Rol
e” Corporation. Banking and
Business Law American Bar Association.
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really think of Business"2 it is stated that 65% of non-businessmen interviewed
said that they would not use conﬁdential information for personal financial
: gain to the detriment of others who have no access to the information but that
‘~ only 8% thought the average businessman would resist the temptation. A
survey made by Louis Harris & Associates based on 2000 interviews revealed
that 42% felt that “most businessmen will do anything. honest or not, for a
buck”, and 77% regard business as “dog cat dog proposition".
Business ethics is a topic so vast and varied that generalisation about it is
fraught with risk. The businessman who has personally experienced and
become acquainted with a segment of business behaviour usually thinks that
E “this is how the whole thing is". One manager is sure that business practice is
nearly flawless. and cannot believe reports to the contrary, whilst another sees
the business world as a jungle or a rat race. Part of the difference in the views
of the two persons is attributable to their subjective outlook. but probably
more of a difference stems from their varied experiences. Men generalise from
what they know. The accuracy of their generalisation is dependent to a large f
degree upon the breadth and depth of their knowledge. Experience is. of
course. not the sole source ofknowledge, but most businessmen generally rely
upon a very subjective reaction to facts and circumstances.J  Identiﬁcation of Commercial Criminality
- At the Fifth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and
the Treatment of Offenders (Geneva, 1-12 September 1975) and under the
heading of “Changes in Forms and Dimensions of Criminality Trans-national
and National" the discussion guide for the Congress stated that the purpose of
the item was to invite attention to the changing shape and size of the crime
problem. and to stimulate thinking about policies for its more effective
reduction and containment. '
 
The rise of crime in many countries appeared to the Congress to be _
related to periods of exceptionally rapid social and technological change, the
same affecting the styles and methods, as well as the extent of crime.
It was suggested that the Congress under this item might examine
innovative ways and means of organising comprehensive action “to deal with
the new forms and dimensions of crime with which traditional codes and
procedures could no longer cope”. It was suggested that it might be helpful for
the Congress in discussing the broad question to break it down into more
manageable key issues, amongst which was:
Crime as business at the national and transnational levels; organised
crime, white-collar crime and corruption.
2. Newsweek May 2nd. I966, p. 84
3- R- ‘Baumhart, An Honest Proﬁt. What Businessmen Think of Ethics in Business Holt,
Reinhard and Winston. New York 1968. p. 3  
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This issue was described as:
At both the national and transnational levels the cont
rol of crime as
business poses many problems. Very often. accele
rated national,
economic expansion provides opportunities that create n
ew forms of
economic crime; the techniques of legitimate business ar
e utilised for
illegal transactions. By the same token, where war,
disaster. faulty
planning, or inherited under-development give rise
to economic
shortages, smuggling, black marketing and corruptio
n are likely to
occur. What national and international means can be de
vised to free
nations from this costly burden on their national
economies?
Conversely, to what extent do existing laws and convent
ions provide
loopholes for these crimes to be committed across national
boundarieS?
A Committee on Crime Prevention and Control was const
ituted under
the auspices of the United Nations Congress, some members
of which noted
that “the quantitative damage caused by this form (Crime
as business) of
criminal activity was greater than that caused by other form
s ofcrime". The
Committee noted the activities of certain multi-national corpora
tions. and the
link between national and international activity in respect ofe
conomic crimes.
It was suggested by the Committee that an international cen
tre should be
established to collect and disseminate to governments and o
thers concerned
data on the operations of individuals, groups and corporat
ions engaged in
activity of this kind. It was hoped that exchange of inform
ation on the
modalities of these crimes would lead to appropriate collabora
tive measures
to reduce their incidence and intensity.
The report of the Australian delegatio
n to the U.N. Congress
emphasised the need for legislation protect
ing the consumer and the need to
consider corporate crime. The European re
port stated that only one country
had established a special Commission to fin
d ways of combating white-collar
criminality. The report did, however, reco
rd the view that the activities of
trans-national corporations should be made
the subject of a special study.
The Secretariat of the Congress observed in its report that:
For most countries the economic and social consequ
ences of economic
criminality were much greater than the consequences
of the traditional
forms of violent crime and crime against property.
Indeed. they posed
special problems of control. not least because the
y often transcended
national boundaries.
Sutherland.d in 1940, used the phrase “white-collar c
rime“ intending it
to define the crimes committed by persons of respecta
bility and high social
status in the course of their business occupations.
The phrase has since then been extended by writers to cover violations of
financial trust. such as embezzlement and offences that violate the well-being
of the national welfare. such as black market operations. It has been suggested
that the term should be regarded as applying to any occupational deviation
and violation of professional ethics. It encompasses company fraud, large
scale embezzlement and misappropriation of monies, distribution of
4. (liiéeblrll.94%utgigrla:ig. “White-Collar Criminality” American Sociological Review 5
 
i with is often ofa highly technical nature. and ofconsiderable complexity, and
i may involve sophisticated questions of financial management, accounting,
commercial and industry practices. Often there is no identiﬁable vicum; it is
i the general public or victims who do not know that they have been victianised.
There is. on occasions no victim who complains. A complaint may be brought
by a journalist. or often by a politician.
Cressey, Cohen and Ohlin were all students of Sutherland, and carried
on his work with their own studies and bibliography. In 1953 CresseyS
analysed embezzlement, and classiﬁed participants into the three types:
‘ Independent businessmen, being the name given to violators who ‘
convert deposits entrusted to them for speciﬁc purposes while 1
maintaining their regular business at the same time.
Long-term violators. being employed individuals who convert funds
belonging to their employers’ clients by taking relatively small amounts
over a long period of time.
‘ Absconders. being those who violate their trust by removing funds or
goods entrusted to them, and then severing connections with the trustor
by leaving his employment or the vicinity.
The Sutherland-Cressey school believed that businessmen in the ﬁrst
category were often admired by other businessmen for their cleverness, and
~ that the businessman who violates laws does not lose status among his
business associates.6
Whereas white-collar crime had been viewed primarily as a violation of
a regulatory code by an upper-class businessman in a position of trust,
Edelhertz7 claimed that white-collar crime is “an illegal. or series of illegal acts
committed by non~physical means and by concealment or guile to avoid the
payment or loss of money or property. to obtain money or property, or to
obtain business or personal advantage".
The modus operandi is the important factor.
White-collar crime is democratic. It can be committed by a Bank Teller
or the head of his Institution. The offender can be a high government
official with a conﬂict of interests. He can be the destitute beneﬁciary of
a property programme who is told to hire work groups and puts
5. 'D. Cressey, Other People's Money The Free Press, New York. I953.
6. See also: H. F. Russell. Foozle: and Fraud: lnst. Int. Audt.. 1977. at p. 216
7. H. Edelhcrtz, The Nature, Impact and Prosecution of White Collar Crime, NationalInstitute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, US. Government Printing Ofﬁce, - U
Washington. 1970. 
|
|
|
|
l .0
l fraudulent securities. official corruption. consumer fraud. restrictive trade
; practices. and a multitude of fraudulent acts that multiply as business
i ingenuity and complexity spirals.
i
: Business crimes. however, have certain characteristics. The area dealt
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fictitional workers on the pay—roll so that he can appropriate their
wages.”
The conduct that is being here considered is thus in general the taking
advantage of a position of trust to derive a personal beneﬁt over and above
that envisaged by the terms of election, engagement, employment or status. It
infects the lesser in the industrial and commercial scale as much as the greater,
even though the opportunities present themselves more often and with greater
prospective reward to the latter than the former. What is said to be an
increasing use of legitimate business for dishonest purposes illustrates but
only a portion of the overall ﬁeld.
What then are the characteristics of the various acts that together
constitute this breach of trust or commercial morality but attracts the power
of the State? The parameters have been sought to be deﬁned by looking at the
environment in which the various acts are committed.
The report of the Australian Delegation to the Fifth United Nations
Congress, Geneva 1975, made reference to “crime as business" tending to
possess the following features:
I. It was carried out primarily for economic gain, and involved some form
of commerce, industry or trade.
2. It involved some form of organisation in the sense ofa set or system of
more or less formal relationships between the parties to the criminal
acts, such as “Syndicated" crime and price ﬁxing.
3. It involved either the use or the misuse of legitimate forms and
techniques of business, trade or industry.
4. Typically, but not necessarily, the persons involved in committing these
crimes had relatively high social status or political power, or both.
The offences contained within the term “commercial criminality“ are
not those usually subsumed under the regular criminal code such as theft, but
rather are actions that run counter to the regulation of business, both State
and Federal. They are instanced by those who use the funds ofa company for
forbidden or not permitted purposes; who falsify company books and reports,
who violate the standards of weight, the quality and content of materials in
foods and drugs, who overload planes and buses and trucks, all these coming
within the purview of commercial criminality.9
Such offences are thus largely violations oftrust falling into two types —-
misrepresentation and duplicity. Misrepresentation is akin to fraud or
swindle; duplicity to double-cross.
The essential principle in the double-cross is that while seeming to act
8. ibia'. p. 4
9. A. Reckless The Crime Problem 5th Edit, New York, 1973. p. 316
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for the good of his clients the professional or busi
nessman is really acting to
 
 
the contrary.
ltemisation of Categories of Commercial Criminality
Of greater assistance in identifying commercial criminality
and the
persons or person prone to become involved is an itemisatio
n of categories
structured by Edelhertz.'°
The categories were:
Persons operating on an individual basis.
Crimes committed in the course of occupation.
Crimes incidental to and in furtherance of business operations;
and
Crimes central to the purpose of the business itself.
Instances as applicable to each such category and as applied to
the
Australian environment, might well appear as follows:
A
l0.
Crimes by persons operating on an individual ad hoc basis:
1. Purchases on credit with no intention to pay, or purchases by mail
in the name of another.
2. lndividual Income Tax violations.
3. Credit Card frauds.
4. Bankruptcy frauds.
5. Frauds with respect to social security, unemployment insurance,
or welfare.
6. Unorganised or occasional frauds on insurance companies (theft,
false health declarations, etc.)
Crimes in the course of occupation by those operating inside business,
government, or other establishments, in violation of their duty of loyalty
and ﬁdelity to employer or client.
1. Commercial bribery and kickbacks; that is by and to buyers,
insurance adjusters, contracting ofﬁcers, quality inspectors,
government inspectors, auditors, and the like.
2. Bank violations by bank ofﬁcers, employees and directors.
Edelhcrtz. op. Cit.
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Embezzlement or self-dealing by business or union
ofﬁcers and
employees.
Securities fraud by insiders trading to their adv
antage by the use of
special knowledge or causing their ﬁrms to t
ake positions in the
market to beneﬁt themselves.
Employee petty larceny and expense account fr
auds. Padding of
payrolls, conﬂicts of interest, false travel a
nd entertaining
expenses.
Frauds by computer causing unauthorised pay-outs.
“Sweetheart Contracts" entered into by compani
es and union
ofﬁcers.
Embezzlement by Attorneys, Trustees and
ﬁduciaries.
Fraud against the government.
Crimes incidental to and infulherance ofbusin
ess operations -— but not
a central purpose of the business:
Tax violations.
Anti-trade practices violations.
Commercial bribery of another‘s employee, an
ofﬁcer including
union ofﬁcials.
False weights and measures by retailers.
Submission or publication of false ﬁnancial stat
ements to obtain
funding or credit.
Use of ﬁctitious or over-valued collateral.
Deceptive advertising.
Fraud against the government, false claims, false
statements to
induce contracts.
Commercial Criminality as a business — as the cen
tral activity of a
company's operations:
Schemes devised as a salvage operation after in
solvency of
otherwise legitimate businesses.
Securities fraud and company fraud.
Home improvement and debt consolidation schemes.
  
 
 
  
4. Merchandise swindles. franchises buying or pyramid clubs.
5. Land frauds.
6. Fraudulent application for use and/ or sale ofcredit cards. airline
tickets. etc.
7. Insurance frauds, false accidents ~— deﬂating of companies by
purchase of over-valued assets ~ frauds by agents writing false
policies to obtain commission — sales by misrepresentation.
8. Fraud against a government. organised income tax swindles.
sometimes operated or assisted by income tax advisers.
Identiﬁcation of commercial criminality whereby activities the like of
those set forth above are clearly indicated to society at large as criminal is
necessary and too long delayed. The importance of knowledge, of
familiarising a community as to the “standards of commercial moral
behaviour" which will, and which will not be the subject ofcriminal sanctions,
is essential if respect for and compliance with the law is to be achieved.
Root Causes of Commercial Criminality
Commercial criminality by its very name attracts instinctively a tag of
money need as a cause. Economic shortages, social deprivation, inefﬁcient
economic planning, inﬂation, high taxation, may all seem to provide a cause,
but rarely do more than provide what the perpetrator might like to be
considered as an explanation.
More than in any other ﬁeld ofcriminal activity, commercial criminality
does seem to happen as a result ofinteraction upon an individual ofthe many
inﬂuences to which he has been subject during his formative years. Formative,
in this context, will extend to the times when the individual is being
inﬂuenced, indeed if not trained in the ways and means ofcommercialism and
the mores of the commercial community. What he sees as being accepted
practices in his early years as, for example, an ofﬁce boy, be they instances of
no great magnitude (falsifying petty cash vouchers, padding time schedules,
and the like) all tend to create in the mind of the individual techniques
regarded as legitimate which may be utilised for illegal transactions.
The descriptive causation of crime “differential association” is perhaps
nowhere as applicable as it is in commercial criminality. The dominant goals
which members of society are encouraged to seek are inbred into persons
generally as result of inﬂuence from or example by members of their family
and members of their peer group. Awareness of the legitimate or socially
approved ways of achieving these goals may, of course, be derived from the
same person, but where in the words of Phillipson“ an acute disjunction
between the goal and the means for large sections of the population occurs,
H. M. Phillipson, Sociological Aspects of Crime and Delinquency Students Law Library of
Sociology, Routledge & Kegan Paul, l97l, p. 133. See also R. K. Merton, Social Theory
and Social Structure The Free Press, 1968  
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then as a result there is strong pressure
to deviate from the approved norm.
The deviation from legitimate norm i
s thus a reflection of society
structuring individuals as a result of
their being conditioned to breach
commercial morality on account of thei
r being unable otherwise to arrive at
the same stage of material success. Th
e structuring of society so as to
condition individuals to breach the laws
of commercial morality is a root
cause of commercial criminality. As Rec
kless puts it:
It is true. however. that many business op
erations and transactions in
the kind of highly regulated free enterprise
system that exists . . . to-day
still depends upon sharp practices. Busines
smen must be cognisant ofall
angles of their operations if they are going
to survive in a free enterprise
system.'2
Of course, the atmosphere must st
ill exist where the commercial
criminality can be practised upon a
compliant victim. Unfortunately our
society is so existent that such a gro
up seemingly is readily available. The
President of the New York Stock Exc
hange was moved in 1961 to say, when
dealing with the inﬂux into the marke
t of a mass of new and inexperienced
investors:
Reports reaching us indicate that
some would be investors are
attempting to purchase Shares of Comp
anies whose names they cannot
identify, whose products are unknown to
them, and whose prospects are
at best highly uncertain. There is disquie
ting evidence that some people
have not yet discovered that it is impossi
ble to get something for nothing
and they are attempting to make impr
oper use of the facilities of the
investment community.
The attitude of a perpetrator was highli
ghted by Halleck:
Greed, lust and aggression may be nat
ural tendencies of man. It is
erroneous to assume that every offender must
experience unusual stress
before he will violate the Law. In some situa
tions crime could be the
most advantageous and reasonable adapti
on the offender could seek. It
is possible, therefore, that crime co
uld be chosen even where other
adaptations are available simply because
the criminal knows that his act
provides maximum gain for minimal e
xpenditure of energy. If the
criminal also has some assurance that he wi
ll not be punished, and if he
believes that he can deal with his conscienc
e, the adaptive value ofcrime
becomes even greater. Crime obviously do
es pay well for some. It is
difﬁcult to argue that the white-collar
criminal who defrauds his
Government or his Firm with impunity is b
ehaving in an unreasonable
manner. His actions might be deplorable
on moral grounds, but if
evaluated in terms of the success goa
ls of our society, he would be
looked upon as a rational man.”
12. Reckless, op. cit. p. 315
13. S. [7.60Hallcck, Psychiatryandlhe Dilemmas ofCr
ime University ofCalifornia Press, l97l,
p. .. .
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This feature of rule breaking in our society exists more than ever i
n the
ﬁeld designated as commercial criminality. The values which we
seek to
identify with commercial criminality may not be very different from wh
at is
actually applauded as “good business" in society. To quote Phillipson
:
It seems to be very difﬁcult to draw a line between what is deﬁned as
good business practise and offences against the public interest; many
such offences may actually be justiﬁed therefore as simply minor
modiﬁcations of the business ethic. But however such infractions are
justiﬁed by the individuals in the organisations who are responsible. the
differential character of law enforcement and punishment suggests a
double standard of law enforcement one for the individual and one for
the organisation; they also reflect both the considerable ambivalence
and uncertainty in our society about the role of law and punishment and
the prevalence of institutionalised rule breaking."
A strong view is thus held that breaches of commercial morality are
learnt and not inherited. That is, the propensity towards the commission ofan
offence referable to commercial morality is acquired by reason of an
involvement during formative years with commercial and ﬁnancial practices
tending to favour conduct of a commercially deviant type.
A normative desire to aspire to prominence in a commercial
environment, an imagined need to reflect a state of economic independen
ce
often as not leads an individual to commit acts which are deviant in a ﬁnancial
or commercial sense, which acts such person would not commit in the absence
of their resulting in commercial or economic advantage to himself. That is, he
would not lie or cheat unless it was probable as a result of such lying and
cheating that he would gain ﬁnancially.
The environment in which a person carries out his daily endeavours can
well be conducive to such acts not being regarded by the individual as
criminal, or even wrong in a commercial or ﬁnancial sense. That is, the
individual may well regard such conduct as being in the ordinary course ofhis
business and no more than good commercial activity.
Human deviance is, however, closely associated with social problems
and social control. In the absence of self-imposed control, control imposed by
one’s peers, or control imposed by reason of legislation, an individual must
look to his own‘tenets before committing any particular act. It may be more
difﬁcult in the latter case than in any one ofthe former. That is, where a person
has to make his own assessment as to commercial morality without guidelines
by peer imposed levels of morality, the choice may well be more difﬁcult. If
guidelines are provided by some other person, then it will be easier for the
individual to say that the parameters have been set by such guidelines.
Therefore, anything within such parameters is permissable. If he himself has
to make up his mind as to the parameters, they may be more extensive than
where they have been deﬁned by his union, organisation, employers or by
statute.
l4. Phillipson op. cit. p. 103
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Violations of work norm occurjust as often in the factory environment
as the ofﬁce environment. The same compulsion will present itself to the
individual: that is, do I have to make up my own mind as to the limits to which
l can go, or are they deﬁned by some union or employee programme of
conduct? The latter often is more elastic than the former.
Thus. in order to discern whether an ofﬁcer, be he director or employee
in a lesser sense. has committed a breach of commercial morality, it is often
necessary to decide the parameters of commercial morality and thereby
whether they have been ﬁxed by provisions ofthe Crimes A61. and Companies
Aer. the Securities Industry Act. or the Rules and Regulations of a union or
employee organisation. In the absence of their being so deﬁned. a person may
well curtail activities in accord with his own personal morality. The existence
of Rules and Regulations enables, often, an individual to excuse himself for
non-compliance with his own moral code by way ofsaying: “Well. those who
are likewise engaged as I, have resolved that this shall be our way of
behaviour. and therefore it is permissible". Often, if an individual is left to
dictate the terms of his own conscience. he will behave in a narrower field than
would otherwise be the case. Peer group support for occupational and
commercial deviance invariably widens the ﬁeld ofcommercial misbehaviour.
An illustration of the above is contained in The Power Elite. '5 the work
of a Columbia University Sociology Professor. who says that corporate chief
executives and other members of the power elite of America had no ideology,
feel the need of none, rule “naked of ideas", and manipulate without attempt
at justiﬁcation. It was this mindlessness, according to Mills, that is the true
higher immorality of our times, which together with associated organised
irresponsibility is the most important characteristic ofthe American system of
corporate power.
Codes of Commercial Ethics
A better antidote for breaches of commercial morality than legislation
intended to control the exercise of corporate power may be for corporations
to take steps to assure the public that they are capable ofself—discipline which
is consistent with both the realities of the market-place and non-economic
aspects of the public interest. Mechanisms which reinforce that assurance
would need to become effective structural components of the process of
governance and accountability in the Australian corporation.
Businessmen, although they may distrust competitors and the existence
of accepted industry practices which are unethical, may at the same time
indicate a desire to alter these practices and to build mutual trust. One way of
implementing this desire is by the use ofcodes or guidelines. Such guidelines
are commonly called a code of ethical practices, a corporation creed. or a
policy statement.
Codes may be composed for groups of various sizes and orientations —
for a Single department in a company — for the whole company — for an
l5. C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite Oxford University Press, 1959.
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industry or trade association — for a professional or occupational group —
for all businessmen.
Of recent date there has been a fresh interest in codes to guide behaviour.
This has occurred both in the individual States and Federally.
One of the difﬁculties is deciding upon what constitutes ethical
behaviour in a speciﬁc situation. Because of the variety of value systems
. current in our pluralistic society it is often impossible for men to achieve
. agreement on principles. It is somewhat easier to secure consensus on
E practices or on guidelines for decisions.“
Decision makers need some consensus concerning practices and norms
by which to judge whether a possible change would have good or bad social
i results. A code ofethical practices is a limited document but it may be a step in
j the right direction.
A code of ethics can help a commercial man in several ways. For
example, take a situation in which it is difﬁcult to refuse an unethical request,
, such as when it comes from a friend or associate. A direct refusal gives a
% “holier than thou" impression and may seriouslyjeopardise what otherwise is
a present inter-personal relationship. Faced with such a request, one looks for
a way to refuse without offending. A speciﬁc code of ethics provides an
impersonal and welcome way of refusing such a request. Ofcourse, a code can
also be used (misused) as a screening device to be cited when the amount of
money involved is slight — to be ignored when the amount of money is large.
 
A code can serve as a good educational device for youthful newcomers
to the business world. In view of their strong desires for business success. they
' are in dire need of guidelines. -
Businessmen individually and collectively should state their position on
these ethical questions publicly and forcefully. Declarations of codes of
ethics often sound hollow, but they can help guide the action of
subordinates for whom the corporation after all is responsible.”
 
It has been said that you cannot legislate virtue. This objection,
however, confuses what is internal to man with what is external. No one
believes that written rules change a man’s heart. However, a written code may
be desirable because it can make it easier for good men to conform their
external behaviour to their internal ideals. Written codes and laws are the
ways civilised societies have always employed to implement the will of the
members of society and to educate the young.
Another objection has been urged, namely that a code reduces the
standards of some businessmen because the code becomes the maximum as
well as the minimum for everybody in the industry. This objection supposes
l6. But'see also Baumhart op. cit. p. l55: “Corporate Crime. Issues in Research",Cnmmology Vol 16. p. 255.
I7. Business Week. February l8. l96l. p. 136   
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that after the introduction ofa code a manager with high standards will lower
them until they correspond to the minimum required by the code. lt might be
thought that ifa manager would react in this way it would suggest that his high
prior standards were due less to personal conviction than to misunderstanding
of company policy or industrial practice.
However. the then Chairman of the Securities and Exchange
Commission in the course ofa paper on “Corporate Accountability and the
Lawyer‘s Role‘” whilst making reference to his concern about the continued
erosion “of the integrity of the capital formation process and of the private
enterprise system generally" said:
. . . One measure of the health and strength ofa society might be read
from a graph which depicts two variables. One line on the graph would
reflect the level of ethical behaviour. The second line would reflect the
conduct to which the law compels adherence. When the ethics line is
significantly higher than the law line. . . that is, when concepts of
ethically acceptable behaviour are signiﬁcantly higher than the
standards which the law imposes. . . the society enjoys good moral
health. If, however, the gap between the two lines narrows, it may well
reﬂect a greater dependency on the law and a decline in moral
vigour. . . . Increasingly, we as a society look to the law to deﬁne right
and wrong. moral and immoral; the notion that the law sets the floor
rather than the ceiling receives little currency. By the same token. the
tendency to focus on the law leads to a withering ofinterest and concern
for the ethical. The implicit assumption increasingly becomes that if
government has not forbidden it, it must be acceptable. This results in
increased dependence upon the legal process to deﬁne the limits and the
game becomes one. . . as it has in Tax law. . . of avoidance and
loophole closing. The result is a fundamental change in the mores ofthe
society.
The improvement of business ethics is then a goal with which few
persons will ﬁnd fault. Written codes for companies and industries, more and
better college courses in ethics, and knowledgeable guidance constitute a
means for improving business behaviour. Achieving agreement on
fundamental notions of ethics, however, is an obstacle to improvement of
business behaviour.
Agreement on a norm of ethics is a goal to be worked for. [n the
meantime, since there is substantial agreement about what is not ethical in
many speciﬁc business situations, businessmen can rely on this consensus
when they need to make a decision but are unable to provide a complete and
logical explanation for their opinion. Deeper analysis of this consensus might
reveal that its origins are commonly accepted ideas ofjustice. fair practice,
and human rights.
To improve business ethics, experimentation might be useful. Three
examples of experiments that have been put forward as warranting
consideration are:
[8. Williams op. cit.
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' One concerned with Boards of Directors.
‘ Another with management consultants. and
" The third, with a corporate social audit.
Since a factory or ofﬁce building is part of
a community. and since
businessmen desire to make decisions in ac
cord with the community's best
intereSts. corporate boards of directors
might well include a public
representative.
Just as managers now use consultants for
problems in marketing,
production and personnel, they might begin
to utilise ethical consultants.
These should be men possessing degrees in
business administration and
theology, plus some experience in business.
A social audit would provide management
with an independent
evaluation of the manner in which the com
pany is fulﬁlling its social
obligations, and would assure the community of t
he company‘s interest in the
common good.
 
Reduction of Incidence
The Fifth United Nations Congress on the Preven
tion of Crime and the
Treatment of Offenders in its conclusions and re
commendations referable to
criminal legislation, judicial procedures and other
forms of social control in
the prevention ofcrime agreed that it was not possi
ble to dictate a prevention
policy common to all countries but noted certain
common aspirations which
emerged, amongst which were the following:
1. Socialjustice was the best means of preventin
g crime. Greater emphasis
should be placed on social action than on crimina
l proceedings.
2. Historically speaking there had been an a
buse of the principle of
repression without according sufﬁcient attention to
forms of non-penal
social control and means of primary prevention.
3. A country should strive constantly to reva
luate its criminal justice
system in order to adapt it to current social needs
.
4. More frequent resort should be made to the commu
nity for support to
programmes of crime prevention and care of offender
s.
The possibility of reducing the incidence of commercia
l criminality and
deviance by perpetrators in the economic and commerc
ial environment can
only be realised when all persons associated with suc
h environment
consciously become involved in the process of corr
ection. To this end,
acceptance of the following may be worthy of considera
tion:
1. A clear and explicit statement in codes or ethics ofcommercia
l conduct.
or alternatively, legislation and consequent community r
ecognition of
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those breaches of commercial morality which attract the criminal
sanction.
A positive and explicit inculcation into the minds ofyoung persons. and
especially those involved in the commercial and economic facets ofour
society, or about to become so involved, of what are expected to be the
norms of commercial and economic practice e.g. to be included in latter
years of studies for students in appropriate courses at Colleges of
Advanced Education, universities and other tertiary institutions.
The frequent publication and propagation ofsuch norms ofcommercial
activity and practice.
An extended obligation on the auditor to report.
Increasing public awareness and mobilising public support against
economic crime.
An increased participation by shareholders and employees (other than
directors) in the affairs of corporations, and of public servants in public
enterprises)
“
"
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DISCUSSION
Ethel Bohnhoff, A Justice of
the Peace, N.S.W.
I think I am right in assumi
ng the call has gone out in
the papers
presented here this evening
for men good and true to s
tand shoulder to
shoulder and reach consensus
to observe law, apply law. def
end law, strive for
its proper application among
st members of the communit
y, to devil for it,
however difficult, to test la
w. I support that call.
It cannot have been intended
when Lex Mercator became p
art of the
law of England that over the pa
ssage of centuries the liege's su
bjects were to
ﬁnd themselves deprived of b
asic rights and engulfed by th
e worst aspects of
law of the marketplace. Th
e governor was. of course.
the exercise of
prerogative of the ruling sover
eign. Although we in New Sou
th Wales have a
rigid constitution the thin th
read of exercise of prerogati
ve remains.
Even if it does make good comme
rcial sense for statutes to be pr
epared
and embodied as law within a
framework of intention. subs
tantive law, Boards
of Commission. Boards of Revi
ew, with their inbuilt own supp
ly basis (ﬁnes
and licence fees) bolstered by
an ever diminishing grant from
government,
great care and vigilance must
be observed when relief normal
ly available
under equitable principle applie
d at court is to be embodied in
this kind of
statute structured framework.
Supply has bedevilled rulers and
government for centuries and be
fore
coinage nature was the ultimate
deciding factor of prosperity. To
day, money,
greed, and power, if I understan
d the papers correctly, are the e
ver growing
deciding factors. However, pro
sperity is not be confused with
law.
The statute in its workings can
manifest all the worst evils of “w
hite-
collar" crime here discussed in
the papers referred to. The resu
lt is that a
subject of a state is faced with en
ormous difﬁculties in striving for
reliefwhich
was available in ancient times.
Recently in the course of a conver
sation I was told bya solicitor “T
here
is no such thing as a Commo
n Law Statute". True. Neverth
eless, a statute
perhaps intended to provide reli
ef where an equitable principle c
ould be
otherwise defeated leads one back
to the Supreme Court Act NSW
and an
examination of common law and e
quity principles and a realisation, in
some
instances, that a citizen toda
y is worse off than our medi
eval ancestors
knocking on the door of the Cha
ncellor craving and pleading for
relief
“Mercy, for the love of God".
.
The substitution of this right by
creation of Boards of Review, Ad
visory
Boards for reform within the releva
nt working statute, although a step
in the
right direction does not always provi
de immediate relief and one is remind
ed
of the feudal system oflandholding where
peasants were beholden to the Lord
of the manor. In 1979 it is not land t
hat makes one beholden but a contro
l of
relief by statute created instrumental
ities; the divergent value judgement
s
given by their employees which den
ies relief, if not completely, at leas
t
imposition of delay, instead of access to
court for immediate relief. 
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In support therefore of the papers presented and the reference to the
strength of law. if it is to have that strength then the suggestion is an
appreciation of protection of a citizen‘s right to exercise of prerogative is
imperative. For my own part I submit to this gathering that at all times
it
would be ofassistance to fellow citizens ifit were constantly borne in mind a
nd
acted upon by all sections of the community that:
l. The Supreme Court Act, NSW, (1970) (as amended) is operating.
7. Green v Daniels & Ors. HC of Aust, 51 ALJR p. 463 is authority
forthe
proposition —— law not policy.
3. Epperson v Dampney SC of NSW,(CA) l0 ALR p.227 is authori
ty for
the proposition —- law not psychology.
Adam Sutton. Research Statistican, N.S.W. Bureau of Crime
Statistics and
Research.
“Company Investigations 1975-1977“, which has been circulated to the
participants in this seminar, is the product of a joint research project by the
Bureau of Crime Statistics and the New South Wales Corporate Affairs
Commission. lt encompasses a generation of complaints received and
investigations commenced by the Commission.
The four most serious types of alleged corporate crime are as follows:
1. Management Manoeuvres: where directors of large public companies
may have helped themselves to the assets — whether by means ofloans,
retirement benefits or one of a host of other possible schemes.
2. Sharemarket offences: where people attempt to illegitimately benefit
from sharetrading whether by using inside information, by rigging the
market. by spreading false rumours about companies, or by some other
methods.
3. Trading offences: These usually occur in small (private) companies
where directors, sheltering behind limited liability provision, incur debts
long after they know the company will be unable to pay them. This often
causes trade creditors and customers to lose considerable amounts.
4. Outright/roads: these include schemes for selling a variety ofitems such
as land, franchises or rights to forestry plantations. The common
element to all of them is that what is sold eventually turns out to be
worthless and/or not owned by the vendor in the first place.
Pages 57-65 of the report discuss the problems which confront the
commission in each type of investigation. This is followed by general
proposals and discussion points. Some of these relate to possible changes in
‘ Research Report 4. July 1978. published by the Department ofthe Attomey-General and
of Justice N.S.W. Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research.
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the law, but I should emphasise that discussion on this topi
c is tentative.
Already a wealth of expertise and experience is being brought to b
ear in these
areas. as the papers and material presented tonight conﬁr
m.
What the report does emphasise is the idea of improving the quan
tity
and quality of information available on companies and their di
rectors.
1 should stress at this point that the report only envisages the collation
of information that could be relevant from a commercial point of view.
For
example, with regard to possible trading offences potential custome
rs and
trade creditors could benefit from information on the previous b
usiness
records ofdirectors ofsmall companies. With regard to management of
fences,
ordinary shareholders and debenture holders in public companies
could
beneﬁt from a complete knowledge of the business interests oftheir di
rectors.
We fully appreciate that often this type of information already can be pie
ced
together by specialists with some “inside" knowledge on “where to loo
k". The
points the report attempts to bring into the debate are whether this typ
e of
data should be available to everyone, and whether corporate
affairs
commissions should step up their role in the areas of gathering
and
disseminating information. In support of this argument the report bri
efly
reviews the history ofcompany law. It points out that concessions, like lim
ited
liability and the access which directors have to “other peoples mone
y",
originally were seen as privileges, not rights. and were granted only on the
condition of maximum disclosure.
Finally. in formulating its proposals concerning data systems the
Bureau was not unaware of the privacy implications. The report emphasises
that a relevant authority, such as the New South Wales Privacy Committe
e,
would have to be closely involved in all aspects ofdesign and implementatio
n.
Gill Boehringer. Senior Lecturer in Law, Macquarie University School of
Law.
I teach criminology; I would like to comment on the remarks ofthe three
speakers.
First I wish to express my support in general for the Attorney-General’s
reform proposals vis-a-vis corporate crooks and the judicial processing
thereof. While some groups may cavil at the thought of removing the “ancient
right to trial byjury" in the case ofa special group such as those intended to be
covered by the new legislation, it should be remembered that our gaols are full
of people who —— because they are working class — were prosecuted and
sanctioned, very often without beneﬁt of a jury. I might add, by a criminal
justice system which by any measure must be recognized as class biased. The
irony is that today the most serious, most injurious on a wide scale, behaviour
of a criminal or anti-social nature, is committed by just those people the
Attorney wishes to deal with. It is they, ofcourse, who have, until now, been
almost immune from the ordinary processes of law. It should also be
mentioned that signiﬁcant changes in the substance, and procedure, of the
criminal law have always come about as the result of major changes in the
political economy which have brought about new societal conditions and new
j
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forms or'socially injurious behaviour. Thus the Attorney is s
imply recognizing
that such a situation exists to-day. and is attempting to cop
e with a situation
that. quite frankly. has g0tten out of hand.
I realize that some people will take the argument further: th
at this is the
thin end ofthe wedge. and once thejury goes for“crimes in the su
ites“ it will be
phased out for “crimes in the streets“. But I would argue that t
hat places more
faith than isjustified in thejury system as a bulwark offreedo
m. For the truth
of the matter would appear to be that when there is a real d
esire to infringe
civil liberties — for example, with massive raids on pol
itical or ethnic
minorities — the actions of the police are supported by the go
vernments upon
whose behalf they are acting. Just refer to the Queensland
experience.
I for one, wish to commend the Attorney-General for
the good work
that he has been doing in the last years —— he is responsib
le for a fresh
imaginative ﬂexible approach to the law, generally, and the cri
minal law in
particular. Many of the reforms he has lent his name to would surel
y be a step
in the right direction; and for raising the level ofdebate in these
areas we are in
his debt. It is unfortunate that he often appears to stand alon
e.
As for Mr. Purvis‘ remarks on the possibility ofintroducing me
aningful
self-regulation, codes of ethical practices and the like. I can
only disagree
strongly. Self-regulation in the kinds of activity about which we
are talking
means quite simply, no regulation. The evidence from man
y countries
regarding many different kinds of social behaviour —— bu
t involving
businessmen chasing a proﬁt — shows that self-regulation woul
d be a cruel
hoax on those we are trying to protect. I believe the experience w
ith regard to
health and safety legislation in the United Kingdom and th
e U.S.A. is
analogous, and does not support Mr. Purvis’ argument. And i
f we turn to the
legal profession with its tradition of self-regulation, the case
against it is
certainly proved by evidence such as that detailed just a few day
s ago (D.
Marr, “The Case that Shook the Law Society", The Nationa
l Times, ll
March. 1979).
Turning to Professor Geis, let me ﬁrst say that [am a long-time adm
irer
of his work; indeed I may be one of the few in the audience to have a
personal
copy of his book ofsome years ago. White-Collar Criminal. But let me su
ggest
that perhaps we have been looking in the wrong direction in our anal
ysis, and
reading some inappropriate assumptions. Consider this idea of E
dwin
Lemert. an American sociologist ofdeviant behaviour. Some 25 years a
go he
suggested that we ought to study the societal reaction — organized
through
the criminal law — rather than at the individual criminal. He argued tha
t such
an approach was of more fundamental value in coming to understa
nd the
social relations behind the behaviour of the kind which comes to be la
belled
criminal. Without myself agreeing with Lemert‘s own implicit assump
tions
(analyzed usefully by Frank Pearce in his book Crimes oft/1e Powerful). I
certainly believe his suggestion as to the proper focus for our efforts to be
in
general, a useful corrective to the traditional pathological view of the
individual criminal. Let me indicate where this leads us in our understanding
of the problem at issue here. And I might add that there is an increasing
Australian literature using this perspective (for example. Critique of Law: A
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Marxist Analysis. in which see parti
cularly the papers on Business Crim
e. at
pp. 58-65). The primary question b
ecomes: Why are some acts crimina
lized
; and not others? After all. given
appropriate procedures. we could p
ut nearly
all ofﬁcers/directors of every corpo
ration in gaol tomorrow if we wis
hed to
criminalize certain business practice
s which are quite normal in this cou
ntry.
And here I am not talking about st
ealing the petty cash. but quite seri
ous
behaviour such as sexism. racis
m, pollution. tax avoidance an
d so on.   
 
So the issue becomes clear. What is th
e relationship between the State
(i.e. the system of apparatuses which
maintains the capitalist economy),
corporate activity and the process ofcri
minalization? I‘d like to quote brieﬂy
from a very sophisticated paper, “On
the Social functions of the Criminal
Law" by Heinz Steinert. an Austrian cr
iminologist (in Contemporary Crises,
vol.2. No.2 {April.1978) 167-l93
at p.l74). He writes:
The study of economic crimes reveals t
hat they — however susceptible
such crimes may be to deterrence — are
covered by sanctions only to a
limited extent, and then only with nomin
al and inappropriate (mostly
financial) sanctions. This arises from th
e “structure of control" e.g. the
limited preparedness of victims to provid
e information: from the limited
possibility of examination by the pol
ice (as a result of the great
complexity and minimal visibility of th
e acts in question); and from
counter-force (as a result of financial an
d political resources). Hence,
economic crimes, and most “crimes of
the powerful", are minimally
susceptible to deterrence strategy . . . We
may conclude, then, that the
' limited ef
fectiveness of criminal law is not a fail
ure of the system, an
accident or an organizational weakness
, but that it arises from the
connections between the sub—system of c
riminal law and the economic
‘ and political
sub-systems.
Now I would like Professor Geis to commen
t on the view, which I think
fairly represents Pearce's argument, that
the State only criminalizes those
business practices which come to be, or
are thought to be, or likely to be,
disfunctional to the capitalist system. That is
. such behaviour which ﬁrst,
, directly, economically, impedes the
system e.g. with regard to the
discouragement of investment, perhaps e
specially foreign, multi-national
funds, in the case of large scale frauds an
d resultant business crashes as we
have had in Australia in the last decade o
r so; or second, which indirectly
threatens the system by delegitimizing it, so
that the incumbent government
has to be seen to enforce “law and order".
Finally, let me add that this is the argument
which I, and my colleagues
in the Critique of Law Collective, have ma
de in attempting to explain the
increase of interest — including Corporate Crime
Seminars such as this one -—
in this country in the last decade.
Professor Gets
The speaker has raised a quite complex pr
oblem and I certainly can offer
a personal opinion about it. Frank Pear
ce‘s book is essentially a review of
. ‘
American literature on white~collar crime as w
ell as on organised crime. . , ,
-  
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It seems to me that the evidence supporting Pearce's hypothesis that the
state only decn’minalises disfunctional acts is a tautological kind ofstatement.
The beSt rebuttal is an Australian book by Andrew Hopkins reportingastudy
of the anti-combine legislation in Australia. Dr Hopkins states precisely the
hypothesis that the state only allows social welfare because it is afraid the
people will stand in the streets and throw rocks at the cars as they go by, and
that it only allocates a minimum amount of welfare subsistence, primarily
almost at the starvation level. I adhere to more ofa pluralistic viewpoint: that
there are divergent forces operating in the capitalist social system, that there is
an undulation within that system and that various groupings of people at
times have access to means oftranslating their power into action will prevail. I
grant you that these are not resolvable issues but that is my commitment. I
think Pearce's statement is a powerful statement. It may be an accurate
statement. At the moment I am not convinced of it.
Brian Donovan, Barrister-at-Law
I wish to join issue with some of the proposals that the Attorney has put
forward in the recent legislation. He has given an example, an extreme
example, of the problems that can be faced in prosecuting corporate crime.
However, the example that he gave, I would suggest, relates to the question of
committal rather than the question ofjuries. No one I think would dispute
that reforms are drastically needed in the end. Certainly I would agree, so far
as abolition of committal in its present form is concerned. with the substituted
procedures which are envisaged subject to proper rules being promulgated.
The Summary Jurisdiction Act at present does not in detail foreshadow. I
would suggest, sufﬁcient rules to protect a defendant. Certainly one does not
argue with the need for reform in that area. but I dojoin issue on the question
of juries.
I would suggest that some of the comments that have been made in this
quarter onjuries simply have no foundation. lfthere is going to be reform ofa
long standing right in the criminal area. it is up to those who seek to abolish
that right to bring forward proper cogent statistical evidence to show that
juries either do not understand or perversely convict or acquit.
I draw your attention to N.S.W. Bureau of Crime Statistics Research
Report No 4. Appendix IV refers to convictions of 1975 (regrettably there is
no data for 1976 or [977) on the third page ofthe Appendix is cited one case
decided in a District Court involving 16 charges of publishing a false
document, 43 charges of take and apply property, 14 charges of fraudulent
arrangement. The outcome was “guilty", 14 years hard labour. It does not say
there whether the ﬁnding was guilty for all ofthose charges or not. However, I
would suggest that that certainly indicates thatjuries are prepared to convict
and that they are able to understand.
In reply to the statement that has been made by the Attorney-General
thatjuries do not have the opportunity to study the documentation, transcript
and exhibits, I am sorry the practice is not to give them to the jury. I would
suggest that in any lengthy matter over a few days long they be given to ajury
to consider. The argument that ajury will take too long to reach its verdict is
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not tenable. If it takes a judge so many days to reserve hisjudgement and to
come to a decision. then it is the same for ajury ifthe decision is so difficult.
Secondly. I suggest that individual bundles of exhibits should be given
to thejury so that they can refer back through the trial. It has always seemed to
me an absolute absurdity that the jury do not have the exhibits when the
testimony is given about the exhibits, and when thejury get the exhibits they
have not got the transcripts to refer back and see what the exhibits meant.
Ijoin issue on the assertion that “more importantly", as the Attorney put
it, it will place less strain on the accused. If this is a genuine consideration in
the legislation then give the accused the choice. Under legislation section 475A
the accused has no choice. The only person who has the choice is the
AttorneyGeneral and a person who appears on his behalf nominated by the
governor. The accused has no right to make any submissions to the Supreme
Court when the application is made and the court cannot refuse the
application. I consider-that this involves very serious inroads into.the jury
system and, at the risk of being called a purist, I am concerned that we, or
those who follow us, will live to rue this particular legislation.
A tromey- General
I would like to thank Mr Donovan for being one ofthe two barristers in
New South Wales that put a submission into us. We greatly appreciated the
effort and the industry that he put into it and we certainly carefully considered
what he put to us.
I think statistics are very dangerous. I put it to you that there has never
been a really major case before the courts, and I reassert that there has yet to
be a case of the dimensions that are in the wings at the moment. There have
been two cases of any real signiﬁcance that have been decided. I would
nominate Palmer and Minsec as those two. But they are still very small
compared to the time that is going to be involved in some of the others.
A number of the cases that appear in the statistics are cases where there
has been a plea of guilty and there is no question ofthejury dealing with the
matter at all. I am not quite sure whether the one mentioned by Mr. Donovan
was such a case, but I know that there have been several. It is rather
extraordinary because I do not see why people who are properly legally
advised should ever plead “guilty" to one of these offences. The chances of
conviction are inﬁnitesimally small on our record.
To return to the question ofjuries. I think it is fair to say that there is no
evidence thatjuries will not commit or will be irrational in such cases because
there have never been any cases. But that does not mean that you should
subject citizens in our community to the prospect of being in court for twelve
months. and that is the prospect they face at the moment. It could well be a lot
longer than twelve months, and two years is not beyond the realms of
possibility. That is going to place a strain on ourjury system that will create a
revolt as far as jurors are concerned. I certainly would not like to be dragged
away for that period of time, and I would not like to be dragged away to be  
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subjected to a case that is probably intellectually
incomprehensible to me.
3 I still think that juries could
come to a conclusion. They would look
at
l the defendant and look at the bul
k of the evidence and make some sort
of
reasonable assessment. but I do not th
ink that we could expect any juror to
understand the complexity ofsome ofthe
se cases involving sometimes "round
robins" of thousands of transacti
ons. involving overseas securities
transactions of the most immense compl
exity, and involving interpretation of
our securities and corporation laws
that are “gobbledigook” to even
experienced legal practitioners at time
s.
Juries will be making a decision not on
the basis of their understanding
of the case but on the basis of their u
nderstanding of human nature. My
personal belief is that every juror must ha
ve a reasonable doubt in these cases.
I cannot understand how a juror could
really know that such a person was
guilty. I think the complexity is such th
at there must be a reasonable doubt
and that is a reason that I would put for
ward whyjuries are unsuited. l would
argue that most judges are at present u
nsuited to try such cases because of
their complexity, and I would hope that,
if the legislation does go through the
Parliament, we will develop judges skille
d in this particular area who can
spend time researching some of the highl
y technical aspects of the various
commercial enterprises involved.
I agree there is an emotional case for tr
ial by jury. but l think it is
unworkable under the present system. I d
o not agree that all the criticism has
been directed at the abolition of trial by
jury.
Most criticism I have received relates to the prel
iminary hearing, i.e. to
the question ofdoing away with the magistrate’s
hearing. There seems to be a
great deal of diversity of opinion in the lega
l profession but my feeling is that
the bulk of intelligent opinion at the momen
t does favour rationalisation of
the system and trying to get some results. If
you do not the result will be what
the Director of Public Prosecutions said
in England; you do not charge in
these cases because it is too expensive for th
e taxpayer and the likelihood ofa
result is so small that it is not worth the ef
fort.
Rodney Purvis
I did indicate that I supported the present
recommendations of the
Attorney, but I differ in one major respec
t and that is as to the capacity of
juries to make a proper assessment in cases
ofthis nature. I have been involved
in a number of corporate crime trials and I
have been wonderously pleased at
the way in which both the minds of the prosec
ution and the minds of the
defence counsel have been concentrated on
the various issues because of the
necessity of putting matters fairly simply an
d fairly clearly to juries. l have a
belief in the capacity of juries to deal wi
th this particular type of crime.
However, I do feel that up until this time accu
sed persons have been subjected
to burdensome costs, and an unwarrant
ed length of time before a matter goes
for trial and an unbearably agony of waiting,
sometimes four, ﬁve or six years
between the alleged commission of a crimin
al act and the time when a jury 
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finds that person guilty or otherwise. It is primarily in the interest of the
accused that I am inclined to agree with the present recommendations.
Adam Sutton, N.S.W. Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research
I would like to make a short comment on the case that was remarked
upon in Appendix IV of my report. Basically that-Appendix only includes
cases which were prosecuted by the Corporate Affairs Commission without a
special investigation having been declared. They were all relatively simple
cases compared with the cases that are reported upon in the special
3 investigators‘ reports that are tabled in Parliament. I think that supports the
Attorney-General‘s view that generally corporate crime cases are too complex
’ forjuries to understand.
G. D. Woods, Senior Lecturer in Law, The University of Sydney
3 I rise to support the Attorney-General's proposals on the grounds
mentioned by him and particularly in terms of the length of time for which
jurors will be required to be locked up (at least in the daytime) during very
long trials for these kinds of offences. It really is an extraordinary imposition
to place on a citizen to require that he be present during atrial ofsix months or
perhaps even longer as the Attorney-General suggests. It is almost as if he were
being sentenced to gaol. The juror is placed in an intolerable situation. He has
private matters to attend to, he has a living to make. and he cannot do these
things if he is attending to jury duty. It is clear that many of these very big
ﬁnancial crimes are committed in the course of transactions which involve
many different parts which must be proven separately. That is a very lengthy
process and I agree fully with what Mr Purvis said about the waiting time —
the burden on an accused of waiting for a number of years to be tried. The
pressure of waiting is an enormous burden on anyone and although
undoubtedly any move to limit thejury system is something which we should
only do very reluctantly (because the jury system is an important part of our
system of criminaljustice) I think the position has now been reached where we
must do it. Certainly I think any idea that the commercial community will
regulate itself so as to minimise crime is absurd. Although many ofthe people
in the commercial community (most of them. of course) are thoroughly
respectable people who have a set of ethics, their function is to make money
and the function of business is not to regulate itself. It will not regulate itself, it
cannot regulate itself. What Mr Boehringer referred to as the inadequacies of
self regulation in various areas is very apparent ifyou think about these things
objectively and unfortunately there is no alternative to the use ofcriminal law
in this area. We should educate people not to steal things. That is very
important. But unfortunately I think it is necessary to have criminal law and
criminal law if we are going to have it must be effective. It mu5t, of course, also
be fair. On the whole it seems to me that the proposals which have been put
forward by the Attorney-General and his officers are a valid and an effective
means of reconciling all the different interests that need to be reconciled to
ensure that white-collar criminality does not go unpunished and that the trial
and punishment of white-collar offenders is fair.   
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Bryan Kean-Cohen. Senior Law Reform Office
r. Australian Law Reform
Commission
I would like to raise two questions. The ﬁrst con
cerns the international
spectrum. the international element in corpor
ate crime. We have had
comparison of the Australian and United States
situations, but itseems to me
that we have not discussed the essential problem:
the difﬁculties of preventing
and policing corporate crime in the international a
rena. and of bringing such
criminals to justice.
One recent Australian/United States example
may be instructive.
Laurence Maher has written an article (_“Time, Ur
anium and the Legislative
Process" (I978) 9 Fed. L. Rev. 399-426) c
oncerning legislation rammed
through the Federal Parliament overnight in Nov
ember 1976 which was
designed to prevent the obtaining of evidence in Au
stralia in regard to the
Westinghouse Uranium Cartel litigation in the
United States. That
legislation, passed in Australia one assumes throug
h international pressure
prevented in a sense the proper prosecution of white co
llar crime in America.
On that particular occasion it seems that a large inte
rnational corporation of
the type that can create serious difﬁculties in domestic
economies, utilised its
international resources to avoid prosecution and c
onviction in the United
States.
Therefore may I ask the panel: what is the us
e of speaking about
corporate crime of this, or any magnitude, on a
national or an interstate basis?
Secondly, to the speakers who have said that this is
merely a matter of
“crime“, I am wondering whether we should get a
way from the concepts
“crime", “criminal law”, and the “proceedings" ofthe
criminal law, which, of
course, include the jury. For example, when we
consider “crime“, we
immediately face peculiar problems of proof which
may be appropriate for
“street" crime, but, I suggest, not for “corporate" c
rime. Traditionally, the
jury has to be satisﬁed according to a certain burde
n of proof. Here we are
concerned with probative evidence and complexity. S
urely the bestjuries in a
“corporate crime" action would be the directors of
our major companies.
They really do know how the system works. Such a
n arrangement would
revert to the original concept ofthejury as it operated in
medieval times, when
local people informed about the problem were collec
ted together to assess
guilt. Might this not be more appropriate with 20th centu
ry corporate crime?
Should we not, however, avoid talk of “crime", and
look at some of the
other notions raised by the speakers: for example,
prevention? In the
occupational health area, for example, it is much easier t
o prevent an accident
than to compensate. Raising public awareness was mention
ed. It seems to me
there you get back to the notion ofcorporate responsibili
ty to the community
at large.
But the real point here is not to consider such activity as “crime
”, but to
consider it as a matter of commercial dealings, of hard-nosed
proﬁt and loss.
If a corporation does something that society believes sh
ould attract a
sanction, is the criminal sanction most effective? What about
hard-nosed  
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“commercial“ sanctions. for example, sanctions written into envi
ronmental
pretection legislation? Presuming they are commercially sig
niﬁcant and
vigorously enforced. don’t such sanctions hit where it really hurts? Sur
ely the
need to prove cn'minal guilt is quite irrelevant in this context.
Professor Gels
Let me try and respond to what I regard as a very sophisticated
presentation of some very difﬁcult issues. In the international crime arena l
defer to Dr Braithwaite, an Australian colleague. who has worked on this ‘
topic.
Is there an alternative method of coping with the activities discussed at
this seminar? It is an intriguing idea, but it is not one with which I happen to
agree. We can all see the complexities, but [cannot understand why, when you
are paying $3,000 for each of a cadre of attorneys, you cannot pay thejuries
Sl2.000. which is less than one day’s attorneys’ fees. in order to sit in that
courtroom for a month — they may ﬁnd that quite delightful.
My fundamental disagreement really stems from the idea that the
concept of crime carries a heavy moral tone to it of certain indignation and
certain outrage. Let me give you an example (this is a real case from the United
States). An airplane manufacturer calculates that it will cost him SX to insert a
bafﬂe on the gas tank so that when the plane comes straightafter it has tipped
the gas returns to the tank rather than remaining on the outside. If Y number
of people are killed he is going to get civil suits on amount of money. and that
seems to him to be a reasonable business gamble. That does not seem to me to
be an economic issue: it seems to me to be a criminal issue. My tendency is to
say that pollution, for example, which strikes me as a very dangerous kind of
enterprise from which people are seriously maimed or killed. is a lethal
activity. I am not willing at this stage to grant that the criminaljustice system is
incapable of coming up with enough ﬂexibility and ingenuity. I would not
want to eliminate the very powerful kind of stigma that traditionally is
associated with criminal activity.
A Itorney- General
Firstly, I do not know enough about the international perspective to
comment in any detail other than to say that many of the offences that we are
now discovering have elements that involve financial transactions in more
than one country so there is already an international perspective. Clearly we
should be trying to formulate agreements and treaties with other countries.
But just as I believe we will have trouble formulating treaties with Indonesia
and similar countries, we are also having trouble formulating uniform laws
with people like Mr Bjelke-Petersen who holds somewhat different attitudes
to the responsibilities of the director. We are endeavouring at a national level
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t to get uniformity, and interna
tionally I think we have tremendo
us problems,
To answer the general question
concerning better ways of dealin
g with
these offences than the criminalju
stice system: there are more effec
tive ways at
the moment. I think we are getti
ng the most satisfactory results at
the moment
from civil proceedings which su
cceed in getting the money back
so that we
might give it to the creditors or s
hareholders that lost their money
. From my
point of view seeing shareholders
who have lost their life savings rec
ompensed
is far more satisfactory than se
eing someone go to gaol for a l
ong period.
I cannot see that directors with
businesses to run would be prepa
red to
serve on a jury for these lengths
of time. So if we created a panel
of specialist
jurors I am quite sure that they w
ould be pouring money into the c
offers of the
opposition parties at the next ele
ction to ensure our downfall. The
re are other
sanctions that are used such as
removing people from directorsh
ips. These
seem to be the hardest to esta
blish perhaps because of the r
eason that
Professor Geis gave earlier —
that there seems to be a feeli
ng in the
community that because most
corporate offenders escape unsc
athed it is
unjust and unreasonable to impos
e heavy penalties on the few who a
re caught.
At the moment the greatest sin
is the sin of “being caught". Th
ere are
obviously preventive methods th
at can be evolved and developed,
and in my
view they depend on the attitude
of the accounting profession evol
ving some
standards that are effective. The
re are no standards of accounti
ng in New
South Wales that can be used by l
aw enforcement authorities effectiv
ely, but
the accounting profession and the
State Government are doing somet
hing to
change that. Until that change is
made I do not think that we can f
airly set up
any mechanism to prevent these s
orts of offences occurring in socie
ty.
Dr John Brailhwaite, Australian
Institute of Criminology
I do not think that there are any r
eady solutions to this question of
how
one deals with corporate crime of
a transnational nature, but we pro
bably can
learn something from examining
the case studies where effective co
ntrol has
been brought to bear against tra
nsnational corporate crime. Take t
he
Lockheed overseas bribery scandal
s for example where the Prime Min
ister of
Japan, Prince Bernhard of the Net
herlands and other very affluent a
nd very
powerful people were the recipient
s of substantial amounts of money f
rom the
Lockheed Corporation. Lockheed
suffered very dearly as a result o
f the
exposure of that series of corporat
e crimes. This resulted not from any
thing
that occurred in the courts. Tha
t is the ﬁrst lesson. It is quite o
bvious, as the
questioner pointed out, that the c
riminal law is an ineffective tool a
gainst
transnational corporations, but wh
at resulted in considerable damage
to the
Lockheed company was the public
exposure in the media. I think Prof
essor
Geis was kind to the mass media in A
ustralia in saying we were less than h
alf as
effective in using expose journalism
as the press in the United States. The
re is
not a tradion ofinvestigativejourn
alism in Australia, and it is that traditi
on in
the United States that was respons
ible for Lockheed. Watergate and o
ther
disclosures. 
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The other factor that made possible the Lockheed revelation was the
system of Congressional enquiries in the United States which is a far mo
re
effective way of revealing these problems than the courts. 1 think that i
s a
lesson that we might learn from the United States in terms of transnation
al
corporate crime, i.e. relying less on the criminal law and more on o
ur
politicians to play a more active role in questioning corporations abo
ut
suspected corrupt practices, and also depending on the media to play a mo
re
effective watchdog role.
A third solution relates to the activities ofthe United Nations on corrupt
practices. The goal is not really to set up an international court,
as
international law is no solution to transnational corporate crime because it is
national governments who have the power to bargain with transnational
corporation. But one could have a tribunal that a State could go to and
complain about a company’s operation in regard to. say, pollution affecting
the country concerned. The tribunal could make a judgement as to whether
some international convention is being violated. Admittedly, the question of
sanctions is very difﬁcult, but at least a judgement could be made that what is
happening is unjust. Where the transnational is being unjust in its dealings
with the people of one or of a number of particular nations. it could be
sanctioned by a concerted international publicity campaign against it.
John Parnell. S. M., Department of Justice
I support the Attorney on the question ofjuries, if only for one reason,
as I can remember seeing the exhibits in the H. G. Palmer case put into two
pantechnicons and if the jury had set about reading them they would still be
there —— and that was over ten years ago!
Professor Geis has advocated sentences aimed at general deterrence to
deal with matters of white-collar crime. I wanted to ask him if the 1970
legislation in America, the Organized Crime statute, is having any current
impact on white-collar crime?
Professor Geis
I am not as thoroughly conversant with the legislation as I ought to be,
but it is not being used in the prosecution of business offences, primarily
because it is having difficulty on constitutional grounds. It has been very
severely emasculated as effective law enforcement.
I would like to reiterate that I am most supportive of the Attorney-
General’s efforts in New South Wales in regard to white-collar crime, and I
ﬁnd these quite invigorating on what generally is a moribund international
scene. But, with respect, I would want to pick up one comment that he made
about the use of civil penalties to recompense persons who have been injured
by white-collar crime. I suspect that he and I would really lock horns on that
particular issue because it involves, to my mind, the use of corporate funds, or
funds of people of afﬂuence and influence, to buy their way out ofmalevolent
activities. Unfortunately, that is done too often. For example, in the Beach
aircraft case, which I cited earlier, nobody brought criminal prosecutions  
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because, primarily, the relatives of the twelve persons who wer
e killed in
airplane crashes were perfectly satisfied with civil damages. Bu
t the real
difﬁculty is the justice issue. Burglars cannot very readily recom
pense the
persons that they burgled. nor can robbers very easily buy thei
r way out by
offering their victim his money back. I am not very comfortable in a dra
conian
position crying for blood and vengenance. and to put it into be
tter perspective
what 1 seek is fairness and equity in the administration ofjustice. [f
something
is done in one instance it seems to me obligatory and logical t
hat we do the
same at the other end of the spectrum in the social system.
A tlorney- General
I would like to comment on that -—— I do not think w
e have to lock horns.
I agree completely, I certainly would not sugge
st civil proceedings as an
alternative to the criminaljustice system. We ha
ve been Chasing suits in order
to force directors and their families to pay
out to the beneﬁt of the
shareholders. but I certainly would not put it u
p as an alternate system to
criminal penalties for people who have done th
e wrong thing.
Rodney Purvis
I suppose one of the ends that we are endeavouring t
o achieve is to
ensure that we have as effective a commercial env
ironment as is possible. I
understand that one of the objects in preparing amen
dment to the legislation
and to which the Attorney-General refers when h
e mentions the paucity of
convictions, is that persons who previously have bee
n directors of companies
are still, pending hearing and conviction, able to c
ontinue in that position
because of the fact that they have not been subject to
a hearing of the charges
against them.
It seems to me that one of the end results of the prop
osed legislation is
that matters will come on for a hearing more quickl
y and, even though the
penalties may be less, there will be a conviction with
the consequential result
of that person not being able to engage in corporat
e activities for a period of
ﬁve years.
Dr Jeff Sutton. Director, N.S.W. Bureau of Crime Sta
tistics and Research
In the debate about the proposal to introduce a Supr
eme Court
summary jurisdiction for certain corporate offences an
d the consequent
abolition of trial by jury for certain offences a fundamen
tal distinction
between corporate crime and what might be called trad
itional crime (i.e.
robbery. assault, etc.) has been ignored. There is no doubt that
trial byjury has
been a central and vital part in the defence of an individual
against attacks on
his civil liberties by governmental power. However. the d
evelopment of the
corporation has introduced a new element. The kinds of be
haviour which are
frequently the object ofcharges in matters normally called cor
porate crime are
carried out by individuals while members of boards or cou
ncils. Individuals
when acting in the role of board member can convenientl
y suppress their
individual morality which they might use in their day to da
y dealings with
others outside the corporate structure. They appear to accep
t a reduction of
. ...._._...-
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their responsibility for individual morality in the interest of the survival and
! proﬁt of the corporation. This is not ofc‘d'urse‘conﬁned to private business but
‘ it is also a problem for government departments. statutory authorities,
educational institutions. etc.
A system of individual prosecution and trial byjury is not ideally suited
to deal with these sorts of corporate offences. The court system is interlocked
with the corporate structure of the State which in itself is associated with the
company system either through statutory corporations or other economic
arrangements. It is not sufﬁcient in the “corporate State“, as it has been called
by some sociologists, for the law to act as if only individuals have been charged
and only with offences which can be regarded in the same manner as
traditional offences.
There are no simple solutions to such complex issues. which are
essentially part of the capital system as a whole. Possible approaches to the
problem include:
1. Acceptance by persons in their capacity as board members that they owe
a responsibility to the community as a whole and therefore that they
should be as board members subject to a variety of regulatory
procedures which would help to preventin advance the kinds ofoffences
which are likely to lead to serious losses by individuals through the
behaviour of the Boards. The analogy with the registration and testing
of car drivers is applicable. There should be much closer control ofthe
education of directors of companies, public knowledge. the
interrelationship of companies and board membership. Company
operations themselves should be much more open to public scrutiny.
Such scrutiny would have to take into account the obvious necessity that
certain operations ofa business need to be kept from other businesses in
the nature of our capitalist structure but it must also be accepted that ifa
company is to operate without undue harm to individuals who have
little power against the power of corporation then there needs to be
much stronger regulatory procedures than at present.
2. Another approach is to examine the Companies Act so that the law can
be rewritten to take account of corporate responsibilities rather than, as
it is now, directed towards the transgressions ofits individual directors.
The use of phrases in the present Companies Act which require the
prosecution to show that the director knowingly committed certain
offences makes it very difﬁcult to achieve a successful prosecution based
solely on inferences from concrete evidence. Such inferences can be
acceptable in the area of traditional crime.
3. A third approach is to re-examine the structure of the procedure for
trying corporate offences so that corporate structure is recognized and
might include some form of summary jurisdiction.
We must not simplify the debate in order to attempt to obtain immediate
solutions or to protect rights which may not be wholly appropriate to the
complexities of the situation. 
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Del/Sgt Douglas Kelly, Police Department, New South Wales
I do not see any indication in the papers of a definition of“an economic
nature“ as regards to white-collar crime. What is the proposed yardstick for
“economic nature" and just how will offences be divided so that some go to
trial in the normal or traditional way and some go in before a Supreme Court
judge and are dealt with summarily?
For example, twelve months ago there were five persons of European
descent who formed a pact in Italy and were supplied with travellers' cheques,
passports and various other travel documents. They arrived in Sydney on a
particular day in January and on that one day secured approximately
$100,000 from various banks in the Sydney area. That was certainly a crime of
an economic nature. Would it be proposed to have such a matter dealt with by
ajudge sitting alone? I feel sure that the complexity ofthis matter would not be
too great for juries.
A Itorney- General
The answer appears in the paper which lists the offences that are
proposed to be dealt with summarily. It is imagined that perhaps new offences
will be added to that list. The best person to answer this is Mr Roger Court
who is closely associated with the preparation of the Bill.
Roger Court. Director, Criminal Law Review Division
The kind of example mentioned by Sgt Kelly would be covered by the
field of offences.
J. McKenzie. President, Australian Shareholders Association (NSW) Branch
What happened to the Attomey-General’s proposal about two years ago
on the lines of prevention in the area ofcorporate crime; i.e. ifshareholders or
members of the public thought that an organisation or a company was doing
something which may not be in the interests of the public or the shareholders
that they would be called to give an account before a tribunal as to their
actions and justify them?
Attorney- General
That proposal is buried in the interstices of the negotiations at national
level for a new and uniform Companies Act. I have put many proposals
through to the Ministerial Council. Some of them are going to be
incorporated in the new legislation and drafting is proceeding; others have
been delayed to be reviewed by subsequent meetings of the Ministerial
Council. None of them has received an enthusiastic response from all States,
but I would hope from a majority of the Council. As soon as the new laws
come into effect I hope the Council will meet and decide to put them into
effect.
I think that tribunals would be very effective. The question of a
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Shareholders’ Tribunal has met with a lot of opposition from company
directors and other that argue that no longer can companies be regarded as
acting in the interest of shareholders. They are really private concerns and
shareholders' interests are no longer important. Maybe that is true at the
moment. but if it is I think governments should be doing something about
changing it. I would imagine that such a proposition would raise a lot of
opposition when it finally came to be debated.
Michael Rose. Legal Ofﬁcer, Corporate Affairs Commission. NSW
1 will discuss a couple of points relating to self regulation through the
courts of commercial ethics and corporate crime.
A paper delivered tonight dealt with codes ofcommercial ethics and self
discipline. The paper also mentioned codes or ethical practices. a corporation
creed, ethics of an occupational group and self regulation. I feel this is an
important topic.
Australia in relation to the stock broking industry. and take-overs of
corporations, in my view, needs statutory regulation. In Australia the industry
is spread overa number oflarge cities unlike say, Great Britain. where London
is the centre of the business community and many claim that the city of
London take-over code works more effectively than part VIB of the
Companies Act of the Australian mainland states. The report of the Senate
Select Committee on Securities and Exchange on the Australian Securities
Market and their regulation, better known as the Rae Report, demonstrates
the need for higher commercial ethics and greater Government regulation of
the industry.
An individual in this country wishing to enforce through the courts a
high code of business ethics would be undertaking a hazardous venture. A
businessman who wished to dob a fellow director in by initiating civil or
criminal proceedings may well face malicious prosecution action or
defamation proceedings.
Class actions are not generally open in this country to protect class
rights or for an individual to enforce commercial ethics through our civil
courts. Also Australia has eight sets of defamation laws many of which are in
my view too restrictive of free speech. Our court system puts two major
impediments in the way of plaintiffs seeking access to our courts to enforce
commercial ethics or class rights. One of these is legal standing, the status
which the law requires of a person to enable him to invoke the machinery of
justice. The other major impediment is certainly costs. The costs of bringing
an action and the payment of the costs of the other side if unsuccessful in a
class action, or a public interest suit, I would say place an unreasonable
burden for anyone who is high principled orfool-hardy enough to go through
the court system in this country. Professor Geis on page 28 refers to Ralph
Nader’s work. Forthe reasons outlined above Ralph Nader would find it more
hazardous operating in this country than in the United States. Self regulation,
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I believe. in terms ofcomments previously made is not an acceptable form of
regulation for dealing with criminal breaches of white—collar commercial
ethics or rules.
We have a different paper by Professor Geis recommending that white-
collar criminals incur higher penalities but this is no use if successful
_ prosecutions and convictions are comparatively few. ladvocate further
; statutory provision such as sections 367 B,
374 CH), 374 C(2), 374 D and
374 H of the Companies AC! as further means to protect the public from
white-collar crimes, and prevent breaches of commercial ethics. Even though
the criminal penalty involved in the convictions for breaches ofs.374 C(l) of
the Companies Act is not high, 5.374 D allows the Corporate Affairs
Commission, and other appropriate officers to bring civil action to recover
money from the convicted defendant. Section 374 H is purely to protect the
public whilst sections 374 C(l) and (2) and 374 D provide for criminal
sanctions followed by civil recovery on behalf ofthe victims ofthe white—collar
crime. lam surprised that there has not been a great deal ofdiscussion tonight
on the Attorney-General‘s paper on the abolition for some white-collar
offences of trial by jury and committal proceedings. an important new
proposal for dealing with white-collar crime. There was one critical statement
from counsel and [ feel that there are adequate statements re safeguards and
advantages of summary trial procedure for serious white-collar crimes set out
on pages 10 and ll, paragraphs 5.6 and 5.8 of the report of the criminal law
committee of Roger Court and Barry Kinchington.
Rodney Purvis
| I do not mind if it was I who was being incidentally classed as an idealist.
i There could well be a lot said for and a lot to be gained by adherence to the
I norms of behaviour referred to in my paper, but the absence of sufﬁcient
ethics in the individual stock exchanges some years ago is now being remedied
f by the Australian Association of Stock Exchanges which are getting together
! ‘~ with precisely this intent, as are, of course, the accounting bodies.
A Ilorney- General
! I do not want to disagree, except to say that if you are going to enforce
ethics you need some truly independent disciplinary body to do so. I have yet
to ﬁnd a doctor who was prepared to give evidence against his colleagues in
negligence suites. It is not easy to get a lawyer to give similar evidence.
I it is more easy. You must have an independent disciplinary body if you are
going to have an enforceable set of ethics.
John Dixon, Legal Assistant to Law Reform Commission, Victoria
I would like to comment on the Attorney-General's proposals and refer
to earlier remarks aboutjury statistics. There are not manyjury statistics in
relation to these sorts of prosecutions and one possible reason for this may be
an increasing tendency on the parts of government to use either summary
offences or what can be referred to as “hybrid offences" in order to avoid the
difficulties that are caused by jury trials.   
.
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I would suggest that there are probably not many more than halfa dozen
indictable offences in the Companies Act and in the Securities Industries Act.
Of course. there are the Crimes Act offences which are indictable but the great
majority of offences are prosecuted summarily in the magistrate‘s court. The
Attorney’s proposals have a great beneﬁt in moving a number of these
offences, which are quite serious offences. up before higher courts, and I
would like to suggest one thing that does not seem to have been considered in
the report (and could possibly be considered), that is that some of the lesser
level offences could be treated summarily in the District Court.
I would like to give you examples of several useful comments on the
equitable questions raised. The ﬁrst is a comment made to me by one of the
investigators in the Victorian Corporate Affairs Commission who said that
now they have to commence proceedings to recover the fines that have been
imposed on corporate offenders in the magistrates’ courts. The contempt with
which the legal system is held by these corporate criminals is such that they do
not evenigother to pay their ﬁnes. It is only When the police arrive and say “It is
six days in Pentridge unless you pay your ﬁne" that they will pay the three or
ﬁve hundred dollars.
The other comment, which refers to earlier remarks, was made to Sir
John Minogue, the Victorian Law Reform Commissioner, when he was
overseas last year by Professor Sam Dash who was the Chief Counsel for the
Senate Investigating Committee in the Watergate matter, suggested that since
the Lockheed scandals there has been an increasing tendency on the part of
American corporations to go to the Security Exchanges Commission and seek
a clean bill of health from them because it is seen as very advantageous to their
position to do so. That sort of attitude can be very effectively contrasted with
the attitudes of Australian companies to the investigations by the Australian
Corporate Affairs Commission.
Professor Geis
I had heard precisely the same thing.
A Ilorney- General
One comment on the District Court Summary Jurisdiction. One ofthe
highlights ofthe Bill is that it takes a lot of the very serious offences that were
being dealt with summarily and brings them to the Supreme Court. This was
considered to be important by those judges of the District Court who
commented on the Bill. We chose the Supreme Court because we thought it
was best, certainly in the initial stages, to have the most experienced and the
most competent judges we could ﬁnd, because there was also a very deep
question of civil liberties involved. It was a very serious step and a difﬁcult
decision to make. Perhaps the jurisdiction could be extended to the District
Court in due course, but I would like to see how the jurisdiction develops
before that happens.
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David Blackwell, Chartered Accountant
I wish to make a comment on public representatives on boards of
companies mentioned in the papers of Professor Geis and Mr Purvis.
Professor Geis seems to indicate that he favours this. while Mr Purvis
mentions it as a suggestion and I am not sure whether he is personally in
favour of it or not. I believe it would be counterproductive to bring this about.
If these representatives are appointed then I fear that there is a grave risk ofa
personal division within the board such that in some boards the energies ofthe
board members are sapped by the divisions that occur and their usefulness
would be diminished.
If, on the other hand, these people are selected from a panel because they
happen to represent certain bodies, and they are accepted as being public
representatives then I believe that the amount that those individuals would be
able to contribute from the point of view ofa public representative would be
very limited because obviously they would be dealing only in their own
speciﬁed ﬁeld. Surely the people who should be appointed to boards of
companies should be those who can contribute to those companies. and who
are of sufﬁcient calibre and who are known to be honourable and need not be
highly technical?
Professor Geis
It is an honest difference of opinion but I am not moved by the
arguments. I am not disturbed by the fact that it would cause perturbation
within a board ofdirectors if an outsider came on. [am not overly thrilled with
the happy fellowship that tends to pervade boards ofdirectors at the moment,
and I do not mind introducing a foreign element to agitate it somewhat. I
certainly agree with the comment that the person appointed to the board
ought to have a high level of “honourableness”, but so ought the other
members of the board, and I certainly feel that he or she ought to have a very
high degree of expertise.
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I feel very strongly that the corporate world is a secret enclave that has
encapsulated itselfaway from public scrutiny and that any tactic by the public,
i.e. the government and the people, that can enter that clamshell deserves all
the support it can get. I would disagree with the objection to the movement of
public representation. I think that it is a very healthy doctrine throughout the
governmental structure, and I think that the corporations are part of the
public world.
Rodney Purvis
I agree that it should not be just anybody who sits in at meetings of
boards. This suggestion of mine was one among three that were set forth on
page 50 wherein I made reference to the desirability ofa public representative
being on the board or at board meetings. This suggestion. of course. is not
dissimilar to that which was proposed a few years ago whereby a
representative of the Corporate Affairs Commission was to be entitled to
attend meetings of boards (I think in that case listed companies). That may be  
.
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one of the recommendations that is presently concerning the Attorneys-
General of the various States. It seems to me the presence ofsome person who
does not have a vested interest as such in the activities ofa particular company
or of a particular board may well be beneﬁcial in the context of ensuring that
the acts which have been discussed at this seminar are not committed. The
presence of an outsider would have a very salutory effect upon any corporate
activitiy of this nature.
A. F. Rofe, Australian Shareholders Association (NSW) Branch
I wouldjust like to comment on three speciﬁc problems: ﬁrstly, the idea
of some sort of commercial court or tribunal, secondly, the question of the
code of ethics and thirdly, in respect of investigations.
I was a little disappointed in the Report of the Criminal Law Review
Division at their rather summary dismissal of some of the alternatives they
considered available to them. In Section 5.1 (page 9) of the Report they refer
to the alternatives available, the ﬁrst two mentioned were (i) trial before a
judge and “special jury", and (ii) trial before ajudge and “assessors". Both of
these suggestions are dismissed in rather a peremptory fashion. The important
factor about the popular typejuries when dealing with matters ofwhite—collar
crime, and a number of people have made the point, is that it is surprising how
well the juror i.e. the man in the street, can come up with quite a reasonable
decision. Not all magistrates have had an extensive commercial experience
and perhaps to that extent may be at a similar disadvantage in dealing with
white-collar crime matters as our jurors, and perhaps even thejudges of the
Supreme Court differ in their commercial experience and understanding, and
so I think it is discrediting to consider that the jurors are incompetent, the
magistrates are incompetent and it is only the Supreme Court judges who are
really competent to deal with matters of this kind.
As I see it, the result of the new procedure would bring the Attorney-
General’s hypothetical case on for trial in about two years instead of ﬁve years
with a reduction in the bill from ﬁve million dollars to three million dollars,
but then what have we achieved by doing that? I suppose the main purpose of
the law in this area is ﬁrst of all to act as a deterrent to the individual
wrongdoer by trying to prevent him from committing his crime and secondly
to develop some sort ofsocial conscience with which I entirely agree with the
paper of Mr Purvis.
I think it is much more germaine to try the areas of prevention and that
is where I come back to these three areas ofcommercial courts. codes ofethics
and investigation. Mr Mackenzie has already asked a question about the
question of a shareholders' tribunal and the Attorney has replied to that. I
think that one way to look at a company is really as a type of “consumer
protection”. In this case the consumers may be the creditors or shareholders.
and just as in the consumer protection ﬁeld it has been necessary to invent a
certain structure to enable individuals to have a remedy which is not available
through the ordinary criminal or civil law, so there is need for something
similar in the case of the company law area. The idea of shareholders for
example pursuing civil remedies through the courts is virtually unthinkable. I
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am involved in a civil action at the moment involving shareholders
endeavouring to assert their rights and the legal costs involved have been
estimated at something like $300,000. How many shareholders can afford that
sort of money? So I put forward this idea of some form of commercial
tribunal.
In regard to codes of ethics there is the conflicting view that self
regulation never works. I think there could be a compromise between self
regulation and any “take over code" of company regulation.
Finally in regard to special investigations: over the last few years they
have been regarded as major operations, and the inspector is only brought in
when some major issue is involved. I think this attitude could well be
reconsidered. The idea ofappointment ofinspectors goes back over a hundred
years, and the original idea as I see it was to enable shareholders who had
doubts or queries to have an opportunity for someone to report back. I do not
think it should necessarily depend on there being a major scandal. At present
if there is a company crash the inspector is appointed two or three years later
— it is a bit like archaeology, it is very interesting but it is ancient history! I
think the suggestion could well be considered that the appointment of
inspectors would become a more routine affair.
R. Watzlafﬂ Legal Ofﬁcer, Corporate Affairs Commission. NSW
My question is addressed to the Attorney-General. How do you see the
role of the Corporate Affairs Commission in the prosecution and collection of
evidence in respect to the crime discussed, and do you, in view ofthe matters
that have been raised by the other speakers, see the present nature and
structure of the Corporate Affairs Commission being accused of contrivance
in the corporate system?
Attorney- General
I see an increased role for our Corporate Affairs inspectors in the
national scheme, most of the expertise now resides in New South Wales. The
nature of the scheme is such that New South Wales inspectors will be required
to conduct national inspections, and will be delegated by the National
Commission to work in all States and overseas. I see, probably, the State
Commissions expanding slightly. If they contracted, in due course, they will
contract due to the development of the Commission itself.
The investigation/prosecution side of our activities are too protracted.
and are too delayed. We are looking at many ways of solving that, and to try
and keep the prosecution and the investigation side working at the one time.
At present you may have a two years investigation in a report and then
another twelve months evaluation by the prosecutors. I think there is a need to
have an independent objective viewpoint from the prosecution. but I think
they could well go in tandem. There are a number of investigations at the
moment that are being dealt with in this way, and I would hope that that
would reduce the delays that are occurring between investigation and the
prosecution decision to lay charges.
O
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I think we need to streamline the whole aSpect of our companies and
securities laws. the blackletter laws themselves. the way the proceedings are
put before the courts. the way the investigation is carried out. We are doing all
of that. and I think that great steps are being taken. Provided. ofcourse,the
national initiative works. If it does. we will probably have the most efficient
system in the western world. but we still have a long way to go.
Rodney Purvis
The crux and possibly the real thrust of what I have been seeking to say
tonight is to look away from conviction and penalty as being the only means of
prevention. Let us try to do something in the marketplace, in the industrial
forum. on the factory ﬂoor. in the union ofﬁces or wherever it might be to
prevent the occurrence of the sorts~of offences discussed at this seminar. The
Police Force and the various instrumentalities of the State do endeavour to
prevent crime as much aswthey can to try to.do so by punishing those who
commit crime, they endeavour to prevent crime other than by the end result of
conviction and penalty. I would invite those present to give thought to these
various aspects.
Finally, I have found that there is a distinct absence ofawareness on the
part of many people that those acts which I have described as commercial
immorality are in fact crimes. Many persons become directors of companies
having no knowledge at all of the provisions of the Crimes Act let alone the
provisions of the Trade PracticesAct, Income Tax legislation, and the various
environmental and community protection legislation. It may well be that we
need to have additional education of persons who are to become directors of
companies. It may mean that we need to put a qualiﬁcation on persons who
are to become directors of companies so that they at least have some
familiarity with the codes with which they will have to work and the
parameters of the code within which they do in fact work once they become
directors and/or ofﬁcers of companies.
Professor Geis
I would like to make some ﬁnal points. We have not discussed the
Attorney-General’s statement about committal proceedings or preliminary
hearings nor the dispute that is raging about that. I want to enter one very
tentative vote for the abolition of preliminary hearings.
I still think that the procedure of paying jurors a living wage is by no
means the worst possibility that might be examined with more attention.
When you consider the amount that.these trials cost. it seems to me almost
obvious that the persons being most suffocated are the jurors who are
performing roman service.
I would add, thirdly, that there ought to be leverage exerted by
shareholders in some form. But I am terribly underimpressed by the
enthusiasm of shareholders while the company continues to make proﬁts and
the stock continues to go up. That is where it seems to me they become
altogether too complacent; "because it is clearly obvious that they have a
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ﬁnancial investment in the succes of the company. It is only when the
company begins to plunge that they show more vigor. This is not the case with
all shareholders, but it is clearly the pattern that has come to exist.
Lastly, it seems very obvious, and certainly this meeting is a testimony to
that, that people are no longer willing to tolerate in our society economic
kinds of deprivations or depredations such as pollution, shoddy goods.
marketplace “ripoffs” and so on. It is probably a function of the possibility of
living longer in the society, and certainly is a consequence of education. We
have not addressed the issue that there ought to be a more thorough
examination of what, in fact, should constitute criminal offences. An earlier
speaker alluded to that and that is an area which needs much more attention. I
certainly referred to one point perhaps overly redundantly (which itself is
redundant), and that is the necessity to open up to public scrutiny professional
and political and corporate affairs.
 
 
 
